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This dissertation investigates the potential of multi-photon tolerant protocols for 
satellite-aided global quantum key distribution (QKD). Recent investigations like braided 
single-stage protocol and the implementation of the three-stage protocol in fiber have 
indicated that multi-photon tolerant protocols have wide-ranging capabilities for 
increasing the distance and speed of quantum-secure communication. This dissertation 
proposes satellite-based network multicasting and its operation that can profitably use 
multi-photon tolerant protocols for quantum-secure global communication. 
With a growingly interconnected world and an increasing need for security in 
communication, communication satellites at Lower Earth Orbits (LEO), Medium Earth 
Orbit (MEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) have a potential role in serving as a 
means to distribute secure keys for encryption among distant endpoints. This dissertation 
systematically evaluates such a role. The dissertation proposes a layered framework using 
satellites and fiber optic links that can form a composite system for carrying the 
information payload and distributing quantum-secure keys for encrypting information in 
transit.  
Quantum communications links are currently point-to-point. Considering the concept 
of global QKD network, there is need for multicast quantum links. Multi casting can be 
achieved in quantum networks by (a) using multiple wavelengths, or (b) using use 
specific set of bases. In efforts to develop a composite quantum secure global 
communication system; this dissertation also introduces the concept of multi-photon 
tolerant quantum threshold cryptography. The motivation for development of threshold 
cryptography is that a secret can be encrypted with multiple users and requires multiple 
xi 
 
users to decrypt. The quantum threshold cryptography is proposed by using idea of 
multiple bases. This can be considered as step forward towards multiparty quantum 
communication.  This dissertation also proposed layered architecture for key distribution.  
Concisely, this dissertation proposes the techniques like multicasting in quantum 








Chapter 1: Introduction 
Cryptography is only as strong as the weakest link –Bruce Schneier  
 Effective communication serves to inform, to motivate, establish control, and 
emotively express an individual’s identity. As much as open communication plays an 
integral part in society, there is no denying that secrets have had an equally profound 
impact on history and human behavior. Cryptology is the science of secret writing. There 
are two parts of cryptology: first is cryptography that deals with communication security 
and the other is cryptanalysis that deals with breaking the cryptographic schemes.  
 This chapter discusses the evolution of cryptography, mathematical advancements 
in cryptography and concepts of quantum cryptography.  
1.1 World of Cryptography 
Cryptography has played an important role in the history of any society that 
depend on information [1].  The ingrained urge of human nature to discover secrets 
has led to attacks on the secret methods developed by scholars and making them un-
operational. The ongoing battle between code makers and code breakers has truly 
inspired a whole series of remarkable scientific breakthroughs.  
After looking at the history of cryptography, we see that the use of cryptography 
dates back to 2000 B.C., with non-standard, secret hieroglyphics was used in ancient 
Egypt and the scytale of Sparta were used in ancient Greece [2]. These techniques 
were very simple and easy to break with few trial and error methods. Julius Caesar 
introduced a cipher by a simple letter substitution method called as Caesar Cipher.  
In this method as long as shift key is secure, the data is secured [3].  In 1926, G.S. 
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Vernam published the idea of one time pad, where the secure key is used only once 
for a message [4]. One time pad was the first provably secure cipher. The basic idea 
behind it is to have each symbol of the plaintext added modulo alphabet size to 
another symbol of a random secret key. Together they form a cipher text that will 
undergo the exact same operation at the receiving end with the exact same symbol 
from the random key; now the cipher text is decrypted back into plaintext. Shannon 
showed that the security of information is guaranteed if the key it is encrypted with is 
as long as the message and never reused [5]. Various encryption techniques like the 
German Enigma machine and the Japanese Purple machine, secret telegram methods, 
and Morse code were developed for encryption during the period of World War I and 
II [6]. After World Wars, cryptography became more widespread and people in 
everyday life essentially used it. Furthermore, cryptography became a tool not only 
for encryption, but also for other tasks such as digital signatures and various forms of 
authentication. In 1977, IBM designed one of the most popular symmetric encryption 
algorithms used today; it is the Data Encryption Standard (DES). In 2001, the 
National Institutes of Standards and Technology chose Advance Encryption Standard 
(AES) as a successor to DES.  
The mathematical approaches play a very important role in cryptographic 
techniques. Shannon quotes “The problem of good cipher design is essentially one of 
finding difficult problems, subject to certain other conditions. We may construct our 
cipher in such a way that breaking it is equivalent to (or requires at some point in the 
process) the solution of some problems known to be laborious”. One-way trapdoor 
functions, modular arithmetic are some of the examples that have shaped 
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development of many currently used cryptographic protocols. There are two broad 
classes of cryptographic techniques: symmetric key cryptography where only single 
key is used for complete transaction and asymmetric key cryptography where a set of 
keys is used for encryption and decryption. Diffie and Hellman developed the concept 
of Public key cryptography. The crucial contribution of Diffie and Hellman’s system 
was one-way functions or trap-door functions, which are simple to calculate in one 
direction. However while solving for the key, unless one knows certain key details, 
solving the key is challenging [7]. Rivest Shmair and Adleman introduced one of the 
most widely used public key cryptography namely, RSA [8]. Apart from the 
widespread Diffie Hellman, RSA, and El Gamal cryptographic systems, there are 
many modern mathematics-centered methods for securing data transfer. They include 
elliptic curve cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, and the NTRU cryptosystem, 
hash function-based digital signatures. The ongoing game of cat and mouse between 
cryptographers and cryptanalysts continuously generated a need for developing 
advanced techniques that provide perfect security. That realization led to leap in the 
field of quantum cryptography. 
1.2 Quantum Cryptography 
In 1970, Stephen Wiesner wrote a paper “Conjugate Coding,” in which he 
explained how quantum physics can be used in principle to produce bank notes that 
would be impossible to forge [9]. Although the idea of quantum money proposed by 
Wiesner was impractical, the idea lead to series of experiments in the fiels of quantum 
cryptography. In quantum cryptography, security depends on two fundamental physical 
laws called as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and no-cloning theorem [10].  
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Quantum information can be represented in the form of a qubit (short for quantum 
bit). A quantum bit, or qubit, is a quantum system in which the classical Boolean states 0 
and 1 are replaced by a pair of mutually orthogonal quantum states labeled by{|0⟩, |1⟩} 
[11]. Physically, a qubit corresponds typically to the two levels of some microscopic 
system such as a polarized photon, a trapped ion, a nuclear spin, etc. However, unlike the 
other classical quantities, qubit need not be in either the 0 or 1 state but can occupy both 
states at the same time. This characteristic is based on superposition principle of qubit 
[12].  
Although currently information sent via quantum bits is unconditionally secure, 
there are practical limitations associated with transferring a qubit on a physical medium 
like an optical fiber, wireless, etc. The technologies necessary for transmission are still in 
the embryonic phase for quantum information processing. However to make use of the 
best available method, the following process can be followed: Rather than sending all the 
information on qubits, one can just send the essential “keys” for encrypting data. Several 
companies are focusing quantum key distribution (QKD) that protects data through this 
aspect of exchanging secret keys [13]. Charles H. Bennett of IBM and Gilles Brassard of 
the University of Montreal hence proposed the first protocol for quantum cryptography in 
1984 the name BB84. A key distribution using QKD would be almost impossible to steal 
because QKD systems continually and randomly generate new private keys that the 
sender and the recipient share.  
 Foundation of QKD rests on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. A standard laser 
can be modified to emit single photons, each with a particular orientation. Eavesdroppers 
in cryptography parlance can record the orientations with photon detectors, but doing so 
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changes the orientation of some photons, thus alerting the sender and receiver of a 
compromised transmission and increasing bit error rate (BER) in the transmission. If the 
BER is sufficiently small, it can be assumed that information transferred is secure; and 
one can derive the right information with arbitrarily high precision. A high BER will 
likely indicate an intrusion, so the sender and receiver could discard those keys or bits 
and reinitiate the process of deriving the key. Two companies, MagiQ Technologies 
(New York, NY) and ID Quantique (Geneva, Switzerland) have released commercial 
QKD systems and are successful in accomplishing the first step toward quantum 
communication [14, 15].  
“The quantum communication is a combination of the quantum cryptography and 
modern communication techniques such as the optical communication, mobile 
communication, and Internet network techniques” [16].  
According to a paper entitled “Recent Development In Quantum Communication” by 
Song Si Yu and Wang Chuan [17], quantum communication offers more power than 
QKD. Quantum secret sharing (QSS) distributes secret keys to two or more shared users 
[18], which can be viewed as quantum key distribution between multi-users. Quantum 
teleportation is a basic ingredient in quantum information architectures [19]. The 
principle of quantum teleportation is to transfer an unknown state to the legal user at a 
distant distance. Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) offers direct 
communication of secret messages between distant users, which eliminate the need for 
another classical communication as in the case with QKD 
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1.3 Aim and scope of the dissertation 
The specific aim of this dissertation is to propose a composite system for quantum 
key distribution to secure global communication using multi-photon tolerant quantum 
cryptography protocols. There are three parts associated with proposed composite 
system: first is the network of satellites, second is the ground to air communication and 
third is the ground-to-ground communication. In this dissertation, we primarily focus on 
satellite network part and ground to air communication. For configuring the composite 
system, a logical layered architecture is proposed. This dissertation also proposes a 
quantum protocol suite to bring into attention the need of standardization in the field of 
quantum communication. 
Quantum communication as of now is restricted for point-to-point communication. 
This dissertation proposes a multi-photon based threshold quantum cryptography where 
more than two parties are required to contribute to encrypt or decrypt a secret key. The 
idea of threshold cryptography is to protect information by distributing it among 
authenticated users. The scheme can be considered as a step towards multiparty to 
multiparty quantum cryptography. This dissertation also proposes a scheme based on 
wavelength division multiplexing for multi-photon tolerant protocol for multicasting over 
free space optics links.  The proposed lab implementation setup is explained for the proof 
of concept of multicasting. The key management in case of multiparty is explained with 
the quantum thresholding protocol. 






1.4 Organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation aims to establish multi-photon tolerant protocol based global quantum 
key distribution system. Chpater 1 begins with some background information about 
cryptography. Chapter 2 describes the research done in the fields of quantum 
cryptography. It starts with the description of BB84 protocol and its variants and practical 
challenges associated with implementing them. It further explains the multi-photon 
tolerant protocol like three-stage protocol. Chapter 3 explains braided single-stage 
protocol with its lab implementation details and error analysis related to implementation. 
It further describes the optical burst switched (OBS) network concepts and how braided 
single-stage protocol can be implemented on it. The aforementioned application in OBS 
takes care of the ground-to-ground communication part of the composite system. Chapter 
4 aims at implementing the braided single-stage protocol for satellite to ground 
communication. It shows that the security can be applied to geostationary level of 
satellites. Chapter 5 explains the concept of multi-photon based threshold quantum 
cryptography scheme with possible application. Chapter 6 describes the global quantum 
key distribution system with layered architecture, multicasting, key management and 




Chapter 2: Quantum Communications 
 Quantum communication is an art of transferring quantum state from one place to 
another. It is a filed of applied quantum physics closely related to quantum information 
processing and quantum teleportation. Its most interesting application is protecting 
information channel against eavesdropping by means of quantum cryptography. Before 
explaining the details of quantum key distribution protocols we understand an evaluation 
of the security schemes provided by the cryptographic techniques with following 
definitions [20].  
i. Provable security: A cryptographic method is said to be provably secure (that is, 
proof is subject to assumption) if the struggle of cracking a code can be shown to 
be essentially as difficult as answering a well-known, very difficult problem.   
ii. Computational security: A proposed security method is called as computationally 
secured if the amount of computational effort required to break the system 
security would require by a comfortable margin more computational resources 
than are available to the adversary.  
iii. Unconditional security: The system approach to security is based on the 
supposition that even if the adversary possesses unlimited computational 
resources, the security of the system could not be broken by any means. This 
system is also called perfect security. To date, the one- time-pad technique is the 
only method considered to be included in this method. 
Quantum cryptography has been proven unconditionally secured because it is 
invulnerable to attacks as it employs fundamental laws of physics like the uncertainty 
principle and the no-cloning theorem [21]. According to the principles of quantum 
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mechanics, any type of attempt to measure photons will cause disturbances in their state. 
By detecting this disturbance, the presence of an adversary will be sensed on the channel. 
In other words, when information is encoded in non-orthogonal quantum states, one 
obtains a communication channel with a transmission that in principle cannot be copied 
or read by an eavesdropper.  
 This chapter addresses the most popular application of quantum cryptography, 
which is quantum key distribution. First we will understand BB84 protocol and its 
variants for QKD. The second section explains the challenges in the implementation of 
QKD protocols for quantum communication. Further the last section explains an 
approach for quantum secure communication using multiple photons.  
2.1 Quantum Key Distribution 
Quantum mechanics is the basis on which quantum key distribution protocols rely 
to transfer and share keys. In QKD, information is encoded into one degree of freedom of 
photons (e.g. polarization state), while the other degrees of freedom (phase, wavelength 
etc.) must contain no information[22]. The common entities used in the description of the 
protocols are: Alice, who is sender of keys; Bob, who is receiver; Eve is the intruder or 
eavesdropper. There are usually three phases for all QKD protocols namely raw key 
exchange, key sifting, and key distillation. The raw key exchange is the only quantum 
part of the overall process because it is the only stage at which quantum states are 
transmitted between Alice and Bob.  
2.1.1 BB84  
Theoretical physicists Charles Bennett (IBM) and Gilles Brassard (University of 
Montreal) proposed the first method of secure key transmission using quantum physics in 
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1984 [23]. Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum channel and classical public 
channel. The protocol uses four quantum states and two bases. In terms of polarization of 
light, the bases can be represented as either |→⟩ and |↑⟩ (or |𝐻⟩ and |𝑉⟩) for the 
horizontal/vertical (H/V or +) basis,  and |↗⟩ and |↖⟩ (or |𝐷⟩ and |𝐴⟩) for the 
diagonal/anti-diagonal (D/A or ×) basis. The procedure is as follow: 
1. Alice chooses a random bit string and a random sequence of polarization bases for 
encoding the bits and sends the encoded qubits over the quantum channel to Bob. 
2. As Bob receives the photons, he decides randomly, for each photon and 
independently of Alice, whether to measure using + basis or × basis and 
interprets the result of the measurement as a binary 0 or 1. 
3. A random answer is produced when one tries to measure horizontal polarization 
on diagonal photon and vice versa. Thus, Bob obtains useful data only from half 
of the photons on which Bob detects perfect polarization basis [24].  
4. The key exchange stage is now completed. Now the key sifting stage will start. At 
this point, Alice and Bob discuss their bases. They will discard all the bits where 
different bases have been used. These steps come at high cost; almost 50% of the 
raw key bits are discarded in order to generate what we call a sifted key.   
5. If the error level is higher than the security threshold previously agreed by both 
parties, Alice and Bob terminate the key agreement based on the assumption that 
"the quantum channel is eavesdropped," and the protocol is restarted [21].  
Error correction and privacy amplification are then performed to distill the key and 
reduce the amount of information that Eve got by intercepting the channels. The 
following table shows the protocol steps with specific examples.  
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Legends used: D: × basis, R: + basis, = accepted positions 
Quantum Transmission                
Alice’s random bits 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Random sending bases D R D R R R R R D D R D D D R 
Photons Alice sends                
Random receiving base R D D R R D D R D R D D D D R 
Bits as received by Bob 1  1  1 0 0 0  1 1 1  0 1 
Public Discussion                
Bob reports bases of 
received bits 
R  D  R D D R  R D D  D R 
Alice says which bases 
were correct 
  =  =   =    =  = = 
Presumably shared 
information 
  1  1   0    1  0 1 
Bob reveals some key 
bits at random 
    1         0  
Alice confirms them     =       =    
Outcome                
Remaining shared secret 
bit 
  1     0    1   1 
Table 1 Illustration of the BB84 protocol with specific example 
At this moment, Alice and Bob possess identical strings, but those strings are not 
completely private. Eve may have gained some information about them either by beam 
splitting or through intercept/resend [25]. The procedures of reconciliation and privacy 
amplification are purely classical and were first introduced in 1992 by Bennett et al. 
Privacy amplification is the art of distilling highly secret shared information, perhaps for 
use as a cryptographic key, from a larger body of shared information that is only 
partially secret [26]. The aim behind PA is to diminish any information Eve has on the 
sifted key. According to Claude Shannon, the mutual information given by 𝐼(𝐴: 𝐵) = 
𝐻(𝐴) + 𝐻(𝐵) − 𝐻(𝐴𝐵) is the fraction of perfectly correlated keys that can be extracted 
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from the partially correlated sifted keys. The fraction of the key to be discarded is equal 
to min(𝐼𝐸𝐵, 𝐼𝐸𝐴); 𝐼𝐸 is Eve’s information about the sifted key of Alice and Bob. IEB and IEA 
represents mutual information of Eve with Bob and Alice respectively. A PA procedure 
that works in a provable manner is based on two-universal hash functions. In summary, 
the extractable fraction of the key using one-way post processing is given by:  
𝑟 = 𝐼(𝐴: 𝐵) − min(𝐼𝐸𝐴 , 𝐼𝐸𝐵). 
Other forms of post-processing procedure exist, such as the two-way post- processing. In 
this type of post-processing both Alice and Bob can be senders and the bounds on the 
extractable fraction can be significantly improved [27-29].  
 
2.1.2 Variants of BB84  
 After the successful experimental realization of the BB84 protocol [30], there 
were many variants that emerged. To name a few, decoy state protocol[31], SARG04 
protocol[32]and B92 protocol [33].   
E91 Protocol: This was proposed before implementation of BB84. The approach is 
different than BB84 because the Ekert scheme [34] uses entangled pairs of photons  
instead of single photons and Bell state measurement. The scheme relies on two 
properties of entanglement. First, the entangled states are perfectly correlated in the sense 
that if Alice and Bob both measure whether their particles have vertical or horizontal 
polarizations, they always get the same answer with 100% probability. Second, any 




Decoy state protocol: In QKD protocols, it is difficult to generate single photon because 
perfect single-photon source does not exist. Instead, practical sources, such as weak 
coherent state laser source, are widely used for QKD. In Decoy state QKD, a few 
different photon intensities instead of one. The details are mentioned in chapter 4.  
SARG04 protocol: It is provably better than BB84 against photon number splitting 
(PNS) attacks at zero error. If the pulse contains more than one photon, then Eve can split 
off the extra photons and transmit the remaining single photon to Bob. This is the basis of 
the PNS attack. It shows that by encoding a classical bit in sets of non-orthogonal qubit 
states, quantum cryptography can be made significantly more robust against PNS attacks. 
The protocol is identical to the BB84 protocol for all the manipulations at the quantum 
level and differs only in the classical sifting procedure. 
2.2 Challenges to QKD 
Despite the important theoretical and experimental achievements, a number of key 
challenges remain for QKD to be widely used for securing everyday interactions. Few of 
the major challenges for developing high performance and low cost QKD systems are 
discussed as follows. 
2.2.1 Key rate and distance 
 Currently a strong disparity exists between current classical communication and 
QKD data rates. While classical systems are achieving the speeds of few Tbit/sec; 
quantum systems are able to reach only few Mbits/sec. This is because the key rate 
depends crucially on the performance of the detector used. Some of the photo detectors 
are avalanche photodiodes that operate above the breakdown voltage in Geiger mode. 
The maximum operating speed is in few ns [35].  Key rate increase is possible using 
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wavelength or spatial mode multiplexing technologies that have been routinely used for 
increasing the bandwidth in data communications[36]. Extending the communication 
range of QKD systems is a major driving factor for technological developments in view 
of future network applications. The use of single photon detectors with low noise is the 
key in increasing distances of communication. In particular, the attainable distance range 
depends on the type and operation temperature of the detectors[37]. InGaAs avalanche 
photodiodes can tolerate losses of 30 and 52 dB when cooled to -30 and -120 °C. This 
loss is equivalent to 360 km of standard single mode fiber.  Free space optics techniques 
work great for achieving more distances.  
2.2.2 Cost and robustness 
 For QKD systems to be used in real world networks, the system needs to be 
robust and low cost along with highly efficient. Experiments like mentioned in [38, 39] 
show that QKD systems can co-exist within existing fiber architecture. The high cost is a 
result of the highly specialized single photon generators and detectors. Another important 
avenue to address the issue of cost and robustness is photonic integration. Chip-scale 
integration will bring high level of miniaturization, leading to compact and light- weight 
QKD modules that can be mass-manufactured at low cost.  
2.2.3 Security aspects 
 Though quantum cryptography provides unconditional security theoretically, 
there are certain security challenges for practical implementations. These challenges arise 
due to imperfections of the devices used in QKD systems. For example, QKD always rely 
on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons. The paper [40] 
demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two commercially available QKD 
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systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. 
Reference [41] studied the risk of Trojan horse attacks due to back reflections from 
commonly used optical components in QKD. The point-to-point communication nature 
of QKD restricts the potential growth and makes it more vulnerable to denial of service 
attacks. In such attacks if Eve is not able to obtain any key, she will simply cut the 
communication channel. The post processing in any quantum key distribution protocol is 
usually done over the public channel. In addition, there is the need to have strong 
authentication algorithms in order to prevent the man-in-the-middle attack.  The attack 
using this kind of inconsistency between the theoretical protocol and its hardware 
implementation is usually called side channel attacks. Thus, for any practical 
cryptographic implementation scheme it is important to carefully design secure sources, 
detectors and observe side channels for any losses or eavesdropping.  
2.3 Multi-photon approach for quantum secure communication  
 The security of quantum cryptography is based on the inherent uncertainty in 
quantum phenomena. It is the only known means of providing unconditionally secure 
communication other than one time pad. Most of the contemporary methods of quantum 
communication are BB84 based. However, as seen in the previous section there are some 
challenges for implementing QKD with single photons in practice. The multi-photon 
tolerant approach to quantum cryptography provides a quantum level security while using 
more than a single photon per transmission. A major advantage of this multi-photon 
approach is by allowing more than single photon per time slot, with the photons carry 
polarization-encoded information at high speed and over long distances [42]. For BB84 
and its variants, qubits are transmitted only in one direction, and classical information is 
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exchanged thereafter. With multi-photon tolerant protocols data can be sent over quantum 
channel without the need of post-processing over classical channel. The three-stage 
protocol, braided single-stage protocol, Yuen’s Y-00 protocol are some of the examples 
for multi-photon approach. Y-00 protocol is different from QKD protocol in a manner 
that it is used as quantum stream cipher. 
2.3.1 Three stage protocol 
 Dr. Kak proposed the three-stage protocol in 2006 [43]. In the BB84 
protocol, each transmitted qubit is in one of four different states. In the proposed 
protocol, the transmitted qubit can be in any arbitrary state. A method of operation for the 
three-stage protocol is transferring state X from Alice to Bob via qubits. The state X is 
one of two orthogonal states such as |0⟩ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |1⟩ 𝑜𝑟  
1
√2




|1⟩)  𝑜𝑟  𝛼|0⟩ + 𝛽|1⟩ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼|0⟩ − 𝛽|1⟩.  
The orthogonal states of X represent 0 and 1 by prior mutual agreement of the parties, 
and this is the data, or the cryptographic key, being transmitted over the public channel. 
Alice and Bob apply secret transformations UA and UB that are commutative, i.e., UAUB 







Figure 1 illustrates the operation of the three-stage protocol. A step-wise procedure is as 
follows: 
1. Alice applies transformation UA on X and sends the qubit to Bob. 
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2. Bob applies UB on the received qubit UA(X) and sends it back to Alice. 
3. Alice applies inverse operation𝑈𝐴
†  on the received qubit, converting it to UB(X) 
and forwards it to Bob. 
4. Bob applies 𝑈𝐵
†  on the received qubit, converting it to X. 
At the end of the sequence, the state X, this was chosen by Alice and transmitted over a 
public channel, reaches Bob. In the above steps, one can observe that though the 
information is sent over a public channel, it is always encoded with some transform at 
each leg. Eve, the eavesdropper, cannot obtain any information by intercepting the 
transmitted qubits, although she could disrupt the exchange by forging the 
communication. (The security against PNS attack is explained in [44] 
 
Figure 1 Operation of the three-stage protocol 
  





















†𝑼𝑩𝑼𝑨(𝑿) = 𝑼𝑩(𝑿) 
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In the BB84, the choice of polarization is limited to only four possible options as 
only two bases are used for encoding information on the qubit. In the three-stage 
protocol, there are numerous theoretical possibilities of using any of the unitary operators 
(e.g., Pauli matrices) because information related to operators need not be shared between 
sender and receiver.  
2.3.2 Security aspect for multi-photon approach 
The principle behind the multi-photon, multi-stage protocol is essentially the 
same as that of the classical double-lock cryptography. Security is given by the 
asymmetry in the detection strategies between the legitimate users and the eavesdropper, 
which is provided by the advantage creation akin to that utilized in the optimal quantum 
receiver in the Y00 (or αη) protocol[45]  and the keyed communication in quantum noise 
(KCQ) method [46]. Paper [47] shows that the three-stage protocol is resilient to the 
photon number splitting attack, the intercept-resend attack, and the man-in-the-middle 
attack with the error probabilities calculated as functions of the mean number of photons 
in the channel. We can apply the principle to multi-photon tolerant protocols. The mean 
photon number of the coherent states can practically be larger than 1, in contrast to most 
current QKD protocols in which weak coherent pulses (mean photon number ∼ 0.1 for 
BB84 to 0.6 for decoy-BB84) are considered.  
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter describes the popular quantum key distribution protocols such as BB84 and 
the three-stage protocol. This chapter has described a detailed operation of BB84 protocol 
and how keys are transferred from one party to another. There are challenges associated 
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with implementation of single photon based BB84 and its variants. These challenges are 
discussed in this chapter. Further, this chapter has explained the multi-photon tolerant 
approach for distributing keys of encryption. The detailed operation of the three-stage 
protocol is explained in this chapter. This chapter ends with security aspects of multi-
photon tolerant protocol.   
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Chapter 3: The braided single-stage protocol 
Bruce Schneier states that “Security is a chain: it is as strong as its weakest link” 
[48]. Cryptography is the success story of the information security world. If it is properly 
implemented, sensitive information can be transmitted securely in an insecure 
environment. A system failure might be due to poor key management or human failure 
rather than due to a cryptographic scheme failing. Considering this fact, quantum 
communication developments currently are dependent on practical implementations of 
the protocol as mentioned in previous chapter.  
The three-stage protocol implemented using multi-photon tolerant approach offers 
many advantages over BB84 such as compatibility with existing network components. 
However, in the three-stage protocol, information travels over channel three times for 
single key or bit exchange. This leads to inefficient use of communication resources. To 
overcome this, braided single stage protocol was proposed [49]. This chapter explains the 
details of the protocol, implementation on free-space optics and advantages of the 
protocol considering current communication networks.  
3.1 The braided single stage protocol 
 The braided single stage protocol includes key modifications to a single stage 
protocol that uses secret unitary transforms.  
3.1.1 Secret unitary transforms 
Unitary transformations are used to communicate information between Alice and 
Bob using single stage protocol. The primary idea of the protocols is to exchange key or 
data using rotational change in polarization. Alice and Bob can introduce any secret 
21 
 
transformation that they are capable of generating that follows the commutative property, 
i.e., if UA and UB are Alice’s and Bob’s secret transformations, then, 
𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐵 = 𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐴 
for all values of UA and UB used for the communication. Also, the transforms when 
applied, should map into pure states of |0⟩ or |1⟩ with equal probability. These are basic 
properties on which the successful operation of the protocol relies. One of the examples 
of the secret transform is a simple rotation operator given by:   
𝑈𝐴 = 𝑅(𝜃) = [
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 −𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃




This simple rotation operator would change the plane of polarization through an angle 
of 𝜃 𝑜𝑟 ∅; however, phase is not changed. We can understand this concept better with the 
help of Stokes’ parameters [50]. Change in polarization due to simple rotation operator 
will affect only parameter S1 and S2. The Stokes’ parameter S3 will remain unchanged. 
The rotation operator satisfies the commutative property for any combination of 𝜃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∅. 
The relevance of commutative operator can be understood through operation of the three-
stage protocol.  Another form of rotation operator which is also known as a complex 







] , 𝜃𝜖[0,2𝜋] 
For this operator, Stokes’ parameter S1, S2 and S3 are changed and are considered during 
operation of the protocol.  
3.1.2 The single stage protocol 
Considering that the form of 𝑈𝐴 (real valued or complex valued transform) is public 
information, and if Bob knows the value of  𝜃 used to generate 𝑈𝐴, then Bob has the 
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complete knowledge of the transform by Alice. Comparing this situation with the three-
stage protocol, it can be understood that Bob can forgo the subsequent two stages of the 
protocol and directly apply the transform 𝑈𝐴
† to obtain the unknown state X, as shown in 
Figure 2. So Bob will perform 𝑈𝐴
†𝑈𝐴(𝑋) = 𝑋. If Eve intercepts the message, unless she 
knows value of 𝜃, she cannot determine the information. The strength of this protocol 
depends on keeping value of 𝜃 secretly known to Alice and Bob.  
 
Figure 2 The single-stage protocol [51] 
 
3.1.3 Concept of braiding  
The security of this protocol is dependent on keeping the value of 𝜃 secret from everyone 
but Alice and Bob. One can use a secure way to communicate the initial value of 𝜃 
secretly using a quantum protocol like the three-stage protocol by authenticating Alice. 
To enhance security of the single-stage protocol, the value of θ can be modified for the 
transmission of every bit. Thus, it is impossible for Eve to get the knowledge about data. 
The procedure can be illustrated as follows [52]. 
• To fulfill the precondition of sharing 𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 by the secure method, the three-stage 
protocol is used for conveying the initial angle of transformation. 
• Using the single-stage protocol 𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 is used to transmit first k+n bits of 














• Upon mutual agreement, Alice and Bob use last n bits bk+1 to bk+n from this 
transmission to generate a new encoding angle 𝜃𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 with the help mutually 
agreed algorithm which should include the current encoding angle 𝜃. It is 
important to note that we are not transmitting extra bits in order to generate new 
angle. We are using some of the bits from the last transmission to generate a 
random angle for the next iteration.  
• To do so, Alice and Bob convert last n bits to an integer value N using formula, 





• Alice and Bob compute new encoding angle 𝜃𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 using N and previous angle 𝜃 
such that,  
𝑈𝐴 = [
cos 𝜃𝑁 −sin 𝜃𝑁
sin 𝜃𝑁 cos 𝜃𝑁
] where, 𝜃𝑁 =
𝑁𝜋
2𝑘
+ 𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  
The previous procedure can be repeated after a definite number of bits to calculate the 
new value of transform. The details about number of bits and transmission delay are 
given in error analysis. In this way, even if Eve attempts to attack the protocol, it would 
be very difficult for her to extract any information without prior knowledge of 𝜃. The 
value of the new 𝜃 is derived from transmitted bits and 𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙; consequently, the original 
protocol suggested by James Thomas in [51], is renamed as the braided single-stage 
protocol.  For enhancing security, mathematical one-way functions can be used. It is also 
suggested that the protocol can be started over, beginning with the three-stage protocol 
and followed by the single-stage protocol under the following conditions:  a) Certain 
fixed amount of data is transmitted successfully, or b) the bit error rate increases 
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suddenly because of interception of intruder. Framing of single stage protocol is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Framing of bits 
The braided single-stage protocol provides better security than the single-stage protocol 
because of interleaving of the angle of transformation and transmitted bits. Also, the new 
version is immune to known plaintext-cipher text attack on the single-stage protocol 
because of braiding concept.  
The braided single-stage protocol implementation would require understanding of 
some of the basic of polarization of light because it is considered as one of the methods 
of encoding photons. Concepts like polarization of light, Stokes parameters are 
elaborated in the following section. 
3.2 Implementation of the protocol 
3.2.1 Basic of polarization 
The optical field in free space is described in a Cartesian coordinate system by the three-






           𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑦  (3.2.1) 
where ∇2is the Laplacian operator, c is the velocity of light in free space, 
𝜕2
𝜕𝑡2
 is two-fold 
partial differential operator with respect to time t and r=r(x,y,z) [53]. 




Desired transmitted bits in the key Bits used for a new angle 
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Equation (3.2.1) represents two independent wave equations of two coplanar 
orthogonal components of light 𝐸𝑥(𝑟, 𝑡) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑦(𝑟, 𝑡) . Both of these components are 
perpendicular to each other and travel in the direction perpendicular to the plane in which 
they exists. The vector nature of light as an electromagnetic wave is as shown in the 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Relationship amongst field vectors and wave vector in electromagnetic 
vector [50] 
 
Types of polarization 
Light can be polarized or un-polarized. Natural light, for example, is un-polarized 
because instantaneous polarization fluctuates rapidly in a random manner. The projection 
of the electric field vector on the plane perpendicular to the traveled direction of the light 
describes the polarization state which can be linearly polarized, circularly polarized, or 
elliptically polarized [54]. Each of them can be used in optical communication depending 





Direction of propagation Z 
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1. Linear Polarization: If the two orthogonal (perpendicular) components, 
𝐸𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑦, are constant real valued and in phase, then the light is said to be 
linearly polarized. For the proposed implementation of the protocol, filtering a 
beam of light through polarizing filters uses linearly polarized light. Bit 0 or bit 1 
is represented with the help of linear horizontal polarized and linear vertical 
polarized light respectively. 
2. Circular Polarization: If the two orthogonal components, 𝐸𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑦, have 
exactly the same amplitude and are exactly or 90o out of phase and one 
component is zero when the other component is at maximum or minimum 
amplitude then the light is called circularly polarized. 
3. Elliptical polarization: If components  𝐸𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑦, are not in phase and either do 
not have the same amplitude or are out of phase, though their phase offset and 
their amplitude ratios are constant, the light is called elliptically polarized.  
Stokes parameters 
The Stokes parameters, was defined by George Gabriel Stokes in 1852 [55] as a 
mathematically convenient alternative to the more common description of incoherent or 
partially polarized radiation in terms of its total intensity (I), (fractional) degree of 
polarization (p), and the shape parameters of the polarization ellipse.  
The relationship of the Stokes parameters to the intensity and polarization ellipse 




Figure 5: Stokes parameters representation [56]  









𝐸𝑥 (𝑧, 𝑡)𝐸𝑦 (𝑧, 𝑡)
𝐸0𝑥𝐸0𝑦
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛿 = 𝑠𝑖𝑛2(𝛿)………………………(3.3.1) 













𝑆2 = 2𝐸𝑥 (𝑧, 𝑡)𝐸𝑦 (𝑧, 𝑡)𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛿 
𝑆3 = 2𝐸0𝑥𝐸0𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑛𝛿, 𝛿 = 𝛿𝑦 − 𝛿𝑥 
The quantities 𝑆0, 𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3 are the observables of the polarized field. The first Stokes 
parameter 𝑆0 describes the total intensity of the optical beam; the second parameter 𝑆1  
describes the preponderance of linear horizontal polarized (LHP) over linear vertical 




over L-45o and finally, 𝑆3 defines the preponderance of right circular polarized light over 
left circular polarized light.  
Given the Stokes parameters, one can solve for the spherical coordinates with the 
following equations: 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝐼) = 𝑆0; 






 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1;  






)  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ 𝜋  
The Stoke vector: the four Stokes parameters can be aranged in a column matrix 







This representation is very useful while calculating effect of polarizing 
components on input beam of light and while using Mueller matrices and Jone’s matrices.  
 
3.2.2 Mode of operation 
The first experimental implementation of the three-stage protocol using multiple photons 
was a setup over FSO [57]. The braided, single-stage protocol uses a similar setup for 
exchanging initial transformation angle. Concept of polarization modulation is used for 
encoding bits. Polarization of light for modulation can be chosen from three schemes, 
namely, circular polarization, linear polarization, and elliptical polarization. For the 
experiment, considering availability of the optical components, the linear polarizations 
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were chosen, where 0 can be encoded as horizontal polarization and 1 can be encoded as 
vertical polarization. The complex transformation can be achieved through the rotations 
of the polarization state of the photons. .The signal processing and device control were 
implemented by the LabVIEW graphical programming. The overall mode of operation is 
as follows: 
1. Alice decides the set of information to be transmitted. The data is converted in 
binary form through LabVIEW, and bits are encoded in horizontal polarization for 
0 and vertical polarization for 1.  
2. The beam of light is then passed through a beam splitter into two paths of same 
intensity. Using the assembly of mirrors and beam combiner, the path of beam is 
directed towards Alice’s half wave plate. 
3. Each beam is rotated through some angle 𝜃 by using half wave plates at Alice’s 
end. On Bob’s end, the received beam of light is passed through another half 
wave plate to inverse the transformation by Alice. 
4. The light is again passed through a beam splitter and passed through polarizing 
filters at 0° 𝑜𝑟 90° . This light is then detected to receive strings of 1s and 0s, 
which can later be converted to receive the original data or key. 
5. Now, for generating a new angle of transformation 𝜃, some of the bits from the 
existing bit strings are used. With help of mathematical operations, a new 𝜃 can 
be generated, which will be common and known to both Alice and Bob. It can be 
used for further communication.  
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Schematic for implementation 
 
Figure 6: Schematic of operation for single-stage protocol 
The schematic of operation for braided single-stage protocol is as shown in Figure 6. 
Hardware components used for the experimental setup are as follows: 
• Beam combiner 
• Beam splitter 
• Laser source  
• Light intensity detectors 
• Mechanical beam shutters 
• Motorized half wave-plates 





    
     
































• Polarizing filters 
LabVIEW 2010 was used for interfacing and implementing programming logic. 
Mechanical components like the beam shutters and motorized half wave-plates were also 
controlled through LabVIEW.  
Hardware component description and specifications 
Optical beam combiner: Optical beam combiner can combine two beams of light and 
operate exactly inverse as of beam splitter.  
Laser: The light source is a HeNe, linearly polarized laser with a power higher than 
0.8mW, a wavelength of 632.8nm, and an extinction ratio of 500:1. The beam of light 
emerging from the laser is linear polarized with random polarization. 
Optical beam splitter: An optical beam splitter is a device that can split a beam of light in 
two different beams. In the implementation, an optical non-polarizing 50:50 cube 
beamsplitter from Thorlabs was used. Specified region of operation is from 400nm-
700nm.   
Mechanical beam shutters: An optical beam shutter is used to block the light coming 
from laser. The shutters help to avoid turning ON-OFF for the laser source at high 
speeds. The SH1 beam shutter, operating at a sustained maximum rate of 25 Hz with a 
minimum on time of 10 ms, utilizes a rotary, electro-mechanical actuator to provide 
millisecond shutter operation [58].  In general operation shutter remain closed for normal 
conditions and opens only when a control command is received. The assembly for beam 




Polarizing filters: A polarizing element that changes orthogonal amplitudes unequally is 
called a polarizer and is an anisotropic attenuator. In this experiment, polarizers are used 
for filtering beam to pass 0o or 90o polarized beam of light depending on input bit 0 or 1. 
Motor controlled half wave plates: A polarizing element that introduces a phase shift 
between the orthogonal components is called a wave plate. A half wave plate essentially 
changes phase shift between two orthogonal components of light by phase  𝜋 [56].  
In the experimental set up, two of the wave-plates are mounted on automated 
mechanical rotators driven by APT motors from ThorLabs. The motors are controlled via 
LabVIEW to change the angle of polarization. 
Light intensity detectors:  The photo detectors converting light energy into voltage. Photo 
detectors from Teachspin responsive in spectral range of 400 - 1,000 nm are used in the 
set-up. The results in the form voltage can be displayed in Lab-View.  
3.3 Error analysis 
Data speed and channel utilization 
In the implementation of the braided single-stage protocol, we measured the time delay 
involved due to the mechanical shutters and rotating half wave-plates.  It was observed 
that the time required for the shutter to send single bit is approximately 1.56sec. The half 
wave plates take 20.7sec for rotating from their initial position for providing encryption. 
In the proof-of-principle experiment, we changed the encryption angle after each 
character and the total time required for sending single bit was 4.5 sec.   
In the operation of the braided single-stage protocol, we can change the angle of 
encryption for every single bit or character to obtain the unconditional security. However, 
due to mechanical components involved in the lab setup, the time required to send single-
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bit will be limited by the time required for rotating the half wave-plates. Also, if we 
change encryption angle after a few hundred bits, the data rate is limited by speed of 
shutter operation. Figure 7 shows if we change the angle of encryption rapidly, the time 
required for operation of the protocol is very high as compared to changing encryption 
angle less frequent.  
 
Figure 7 In the given experimental set up transmission delay increases for small 
blocks of data 
 
For improving the data transfer rate, we can use a device capable of making rapid 
changes in polarization. We can use technique of multi-level encoding [59] for increasing 
data rate.  
Error analysis 
The purpose of error analysis is to understand the sensitivity of the devices in the 
experiment and to improve the accuracy in measurement. For the implementation of the 
braided single-stage protocol we have analyzed how the misalignments of the optical 
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components plays a role in the accurate operation of the protocol by checking the bit 
error rate.   
In the given experimental setup, we used motorized half wave plates for encrypting the 
data sent by the laser.  A bit error-free operation of the protocol occurs when the 
polarization axes of both the half wave-plates are fully aligned. Transmission errors occur 
in case of misalignment. We first investigate the impact of this misalignment from a 
theoretical perspective. 
Figure 8 represents a schematic of the system. The incident light beam characterized by 
its Stokes parameters is shown on the left. The light is modulated with Alice and Bob’s 
half wave plates to obtain output polarization. 
 
Figure 8: Study of misalignment between Alice's and Bob's half waveplate 
 
When light passes through two half wave-plates, there is a change in intensity according 
to the changes in polarization. The Stokes parameters are mathematically convenient 
alternatives to more common description of the polarized radiation in terms of total 
intensity [50]. The Mueller matrix can help us analyze the output Stokes parameters of 
light when it passes through a polarizing device. The effect on light beam in the 
implementation is simulated using MATLAB. We keep Alice’s half wave plate aligned at 
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0 and Bob’s half wave plate is rotated through an angle 𝜃. It will represent the 
misalignment between two half wave plates. 











]      (11) 
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;  is given by  
𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑀2 ∗ 𝑀1 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡     (13) 
 
















′  are the Stokes parameters of the output light. . Since the output Stokes 
parameter are dependent on the misalignment angle 𝜃, the angle of the polarization of 
light (𝛼) is varied according to the misalignment 𝜃. According to Malus’s law, the 
intensity of polarized light is directly proportional to the square of the cosine of the angle 
between the input polarization state and the fast axis of the polarizing medium. In other 
words,    𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2(𝛼)                                              (5) 
In Figure 9, first plot shows variation in angle of polarization with misalignment 𝜃 while 
second plot shows variation in the intensity with misalignment 𝜃 
 
Figure 9 With increse in misalignment between Alice and Bob's waveplates, the 







From the intensity plot shown in Figure 9 the following observations are made: 
• The plot is symmetric with the high intensity from 0° to 10° and 80° to 90° and 
lowest at 45° 
• For 0° to 10° and 80° to 90° of misalignment, we observe that the intensity is 
close to 95% of the total intensity of light. Hence we can expect accurate 
determination of bit 0 or 1 at the detectors.   
• When the misalignment of the wave plates is in between range 10o to 40o, the 
intensity of the light decreases rapidly.  
• At 45° of misalignment, the intensity of light drops to a level less than 50% of the 
intensity of the incident light. This will decrease the amount of light received by 
the detectors. This will make it difficult to distinguish the bit 0 from bit 1.  
During the correct alignment of the component, we observe error-free operation. The 
practical experiment is conducted as follows: Alice’s wave-plate is kept at 0o position and 
Bob’s wave-plate is rotated in steps of 5o to observe the impact caused by angular 
displacement of Bob’s wave-plate on decoding. This procedure is repeated from 0o to 90o 
in steps of 5o and a graph of bit error rate versus the degree of misalignment is plotted. 
The bit error rate (BER) is calculated using the formula, 
BER =
Number of erroneous bits recieved






Figure 10 Impact of misalignment of half wave-plates on bit error rate 
 
Observations from the graph are as follows: 
1. The graph is symmetric about the angle of 45°. For the range of misalignment 
0° to 10° and 80° to 90°, we observe error free operation. This is justified with 
the help of the intensity curve in Figure 9.  
2. We observe a rapid increase in BER with misalignment 10o to 40o. BER reaches 
50% which means Bob is not receiving correct information bits at all.  
3. For a range of misalignment from 40° to 50°, we get 100% BER which can result 
in error free data recovery by inverting each received bit. 
The experimental plot does not show a smooth curve as in case of theoretical approach 
because of the quantization errors of the detectors used in the experiment. 
From the experimental results and theoretical studies, we conclude that in lab conditions, 
for error free operation of the braided single stage protocol over FSO, the misalignment 
of the half wave plates affects intensity which in turn affects BER. Hence for improving 
accuracy in measurement and sensitivity in performance, the intensity at the receiver 
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should always be more than 95% of the total intensity. In case of practical real world 
implementation to maintain a BER with industry standards, the intensity of the light will 
definitely play a significant role as stated from above experimental results. 
 
3.4 Application for optical burst switching networks 
Basics of optical burst switching (OBS) 
The rapid expansion of the Internet, evolution of smart phones and tremendous increase 
in demand of multimedia data are continuously testing the limits of existing 
telecommunication backbone technologies. The benefits of optical networking have been 
known for a while now; however, for current optical networks, the speed is limited to 
electronic router capacities due to optical-electrical-optical (O-E-O) conversions [60]. 
Optical burst switched network has emerged as a hybrid between optical packet switched 
networks (all-optical networks) and optical circuit switched networks (existing network 
technology) [61].  An OBS network consists of optical burst switching nodes 
interconnected with fiber links. The development of OBS technology lies in the 
successful design and implementation of the core architecture. In an OBS network, a data 
burst consisting of all IP packets is switched through all optical networks. There are two 
approaches doing this: one is distributed with link-based reservations, and the other is 
centralized with end-to-end reservations [62]. In both approaches, data and control 
signals within the core of the OBS architecture are separated as shown in Figure 11. It 
uses out-of-band signaling for a separate control network with a dedicated wavelength 
[63]. That means a control packet is transmitted ahead of the burst to configure the 




Figure 11 Separated transmissions of data and control signal 
 
OBS architecture needs some fundamental research in the field of network security. The 
generation and distribution of the keys, authentication techniques for the burst headers, 
and data confidentiality methods for data burst are few of the research areas. Embedded 
secure framework using strengths of both classical cryptography and quantum 
cryptography is proposed in [64].  
Quantum cryptography for OBS networks 
 Considering the real-world application of quantum key distribution protocols, 
three-stage protocol and single-stage protocol are best suited for OBS networks. The 
reasons is that both are invulnerable to photon siphoning attacks, both use multi-photon 
sources like lasers that are easily available and data can be sent over longer distances than 
BB84 due to multi-photon polarization modulation techniques. As mentioned earlier, the 
data bursts pass through all-optical paths. OBS preserves photonic modality of 
information within its domain. Additionally with the help of optical passivity within the 
   

















OBS boundary, quantum data can be sent on a proposed Q-channel created between two 
edge nodes. It is possible to preserve end-to-end polarization of photons over this Q-
channel [65]. 
A subsystem developed to implement quantum key distribution over OBS network 
 A Q-channel is proposed for carrying all quantum key information. An optical 
switch can be used for switching between a classical channel, which will carry encrypted 
data, and a quantum channel, which will carry keys for encryption.   The proposed setup 




Figure 12 Subsystem proposed for quantum key distribution 
 
In Figure 12, V Waves represent Versawave devices. It is a device design to change 
the polarization in fiber. It acts as a half wave plate. Alice PC and Bob PC are the black 
boxes considered to be totally secured. Bold channels between optical switches and PCs 
represent a quantum channel, whereas the other link represents a classical channel. The 
aim of this system is to exchange keys between Alice and Bob, where Alice initiates a 
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the polarization analyzer to identify the state of polarization (SOP) of the incoming 
photons, followed by the Versawave device to generate newly calculated SOP and send it 
to the router through port 3 and onto port 1 of the circulator. This enables a seamless 
operation of the protocol. The general procedure can be stated as follows: 
1. The edge router acting as Alice initiates a communication request with another 
edge router acting as Bob through a classical channel. In this step, Alice 
authenticates Bob and gets ready for key exchange.  
2. An optical switch is used to switch between a quantum channel and a classical 
channel. For default condition of a switch (i.e. OFF condition), classical channel 
is active. When the optical switch is turned ON, the quantum channel gets 
connected between the two edge routers 
3. Next, the switch position is changed, and the quantum channel is connected to the 
edge router at both ends. Alice and Bob send known states of polarization one 
after the other to characterize the channel, e.g. Alice sends a horizontal 
polarization (0°) for some time, and Bob receives, say, δb° polarization. Similarly 
Bob sends a horizontal polarization, and Alice receives δa° polarization state. 
Ideally, δb°= δa°. This change in angle of polarization of beam of light can be 
compensated while sending a particular angle. This procedure is called as a 
polarization compensation procedure.  
4. Now that Alice and Bob have authenticated each other as well as found out the 
compensation angle for the channel, Alice will start sending the key.  
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5. Upon mutual agreement between Alice and Bob to represent bit ‘0’ as 0° SOP and 
bit ‘1’ as 90° SOP, Alice will compute 90°+xa°+δa°, where xa° is Alice’s encoding 
angle. (In this case, the assumption is that Alice wants to send bit ‘1’.) 
6. δa° angle will be nullified over the channel, and Bob will receive 90°+xa° to 
which he will add xb°, which is his encoding angle, and sends 90°+xa° + xb° + δb° 
to Alice.  
7. δb° angle will be nullified over the channel, and Alice will receive 90°+xa° + xb° 
to which she will subtract xa° and will send 90° + xb° + δa° to Bob. 
8. δa° angle will be nullified over the channel, and Bob will receive 90°+xb° from 
which Bob will subtract xb° to get 90° angle, which was sent by Alice, 
representing bit ‘1’. 
9. This procedure is carried out until the required number of bits in the key is 
exchanged between Alice and Bob.  
10. Now, using the bits transferred during this key exchange, a new angle of 
transformation (xnew) is generated and this is known to both Alice and Bob. In this 
case, Alice can send 90°+xnew°+δa° and since Bob will already know value of new 
transform say, xnew, he will just subtract that angle to obtain the information bit i.e. 
0 or 1. 
11. When the key exchange procedure is completed, using an optical switch, both 
Alice and Bob will switch to a classical channel (default condition) and will start 





This chapter presents the concept and implementation of the braided single stage 
protocol. There are three section of this chapter first explains the theory, second explains 
the implementation details with error analysis and the third part provides the detailed 
application over optical burst switched network. The proof of concepts has been validated 
with lab implementation using passive optical components. The error analysis is based on 
the implementation might provide useful information for future design ideas. The detailed 
application over OBS network helps to realize the real world scenarios of the protocol for 




 Chapter 4: Multi-photon approach for satellite communication 
Communication today has become an intimate part of our personal, social, 
business and professional lives. With increasing dependency of the world’s economy on 
information, it becomes crucially important to secure the communication.  When it comes 
to secure communication, quantum cryptography is the only known solution that provides 
unconditional security [66]. Considering the global access of information, the satellite 
network has progressed a lot in recent years. The satellite technology has brought a 
revolutionary change in the field of communication with conveying information at faster 
data rate over long distances. With state-of-the-art RF links proving inefficient to travel 
inter-planetary distances, Free Space Optics (FSO) is emerging as a giant leap forward in 
space communication [67]. Experimental quantum cryptography is mainly divided into 
two categories: free space optics (FSO) and fiber optics [68]. Due to propagation losses 
along optical fibers, quantum key distribution over fibers can only reach a few hundreds 
of kilometers [69]. It appears prudent to utilize satellite technology to increase the 
distance of quantum communication using FSO. In this chapter we will see some of the 
experiments done for applying quantum cryptographic techniques for satellite 
communications serving dual purpose of securing satellite communications as well as 
transferring quantum keys over longer distances. 
4.1 Overview of use of FSO in satellite communication 
The ever increasing demand for carrying larger volumes of data over satellite 
links are pushing the demand for using higher electromagnetic frequencies bands (S, X 
and Ka) [67]. Through its inherently narrow beam-width and high carrier frequencies, optical 
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technology shows much promise in the quest to increase data rates. Ever since the discovery 
of lasers, the use of optical frequencies for communication has been pursued.  
4.1.1 Advantages of lasers over microwaves 
The following subsection states the advantages of laser over traditional RF 
techniques emphasizing the higher bandwidth, narrower beamwidth, and smaller 
equipment size and weight.  
Narrow beamwidth: The maximum narrowness of the laser beam is achieved with 
diffraction limited optics, providing a beam-width of 𝜃 = 2.24 ∗
𝜆
𝐷
 ;  
 where 𝜆 = wavelength of laser transmission and D= diameter of aperture of 
transmitting telescope. Comparing the laser beam-width (e.g. 𝜆 = 1.0 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐷 =
10𝑐𝑚 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 𝜃 = 22.4 𝜇 𝑟𝑎𝑑) with that of RF signal at 10GHz ( 𝜆 = 3 𝑐𝑚 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐷 =
1 𝑚), the beamwidth will be 𝜃 = 67.2 𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑑. Lesser beamwidth ensures maintenance of 
privacy to the intended callee’s platform.  
 
Figure 13: Privacy comparison between microwaves versus laser footprints [70] 
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Large directivity: Because of very short wavelength (0.48-0.78𝜇𝑚) for FSO, very high 
directivity is attainable with small-aperture telescopes. As the beam is narrower for 
lasers, power efficiency is observed for long distances.  
Higher bandwidth: Lasers are able to transmit a much higher bandwidth signal than 
microwaves. The channel bandwidth must be consistent with the carrier frequency for 
accurate signal detection.  
Privacy comparison: An indication of the privacy comparison is shown in Figure 13. It 
shows that the field of view on the ground for optical signal is lesser than that of RF 
signal. For optical signal, one must be quite close to the center of the beam to be able to 
listen without requiring a sensitive receiver. For the case of the microwave signal of 
35GHz, the signal could easily be picked up at roughly less than 40miles [70]. For mobile 
ground stations, a combined system with laser and microwaves proves to be beneficial. 
4.1.2 Optical communication links 
 Besides the standard links from Low Earth orbit (LEO), Geosynchronous Earth  
orbit (GEO), and deep-space spacecraft to ground, multi Gigabit links between LEO and 
GEO spacecraft, earth observation and communications spacecraft are also required. Fig. 
2 shows several possible point-to-point optical links from Earth to space [71].  
Near-Earth Links: They include lower Earth orbit (LEO, Geocentric orbits ranging in 
altitude from 160 km (100 miles) to 2,000 km (1,200 mi) above mean sea level), 
medium-Earth orbit (MEO, orbits with altitudes at apogee ranging between 2,000 km 
(1,200 mi) and that of the geosynchronous orbit at 35,786 km (22,236 mi), geo-stationary 
orbit, GEO. The ground telescopes with approximately, 1-2m diameter are needed to 
receive data at high-rates [72]. Near-earth links such as LEO and MEO have proven to be 
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suitable for building a satellite interconnection network to reach from one point to 
another point on the Earth [73]. 
Deep-space links: Optical links from “deep-space” that extend from the Sun-Earth 
Lagrange points [74] to planetary distances. The increased distances in deep-space 
communication causes new link considerations such as higher power lasers and larger 
diameter transmitting optics, larger effective diameter for collecting; and implementing 
signaling and detection scheme to capture faint laser pulses [75].  
Space-to-space: Inter-satellite or space-to-space links are at an advantage due to their 
non-vulnerability to weather or cloud outages. Using various advanced lasers, link 
capacity can be increased and as stated in [76], LEO-LEO links can go up to 5.6 Gb/s. 
For establishing space-to-space satellite links, there needs to be an orbiting receiver. 
However, the cost of maintaining such orbiting receivers is very high. Furthermore, 
orbiting assets may have single point of failure.  
4.1.3 Weather and clouds effects 
 For free space optics, atmospheric turbulences and attenuations are the major 
sources of increasing BER. In satellite communication networks, ground-to-space links 
are affected the most for both uplinks and downlinks due to weather conditions and cloud 
blockage. Various strategies are developed to ameliorate the signal loss and distortion 
problems. One of the scheme relies on a global network of ground based receivers that, 




4.2 Current QKD methods for satellite communication 
In this section we will review some of the QKD based experiments carried out for 
satellite communications. The BB’84 protocol is implemented in practice using single 
photons, decoy state method and phase encoding methods. Other than the BB’84 
protocol, entanglement is widely used for QKD [78]. Satellite aided QKD using 
entanglement and decoy state is explained further. 
4.2.1 Using entangled photons 
  The use of satellite for distributing entangled photons provides unique solution to 
the problem of distance in global QKD [78]. One can share quantum keys over free space 
optics medium and use traditional RF or free space channel for actual transmission of 
data. Thus, this set up involves two separate channels between ground station and 
transceiver. There can be three cases to allow distribution of entangled photons: a satellite 
is used to carry either i) a transmitter, or ii) a receiver or, iii) a relay station. These 
scenarios permit different applications as shown in Figure 14.  
Earth-based Transmitter terminal: The entanglement can be shared between a transmitter 
and a receiver in air, or with a receiver on ground via relay, or between two or more 
ground stations via relay. It is possible to develop a global QKD network with possible 
applications like QKD or entanglement-enhanced communication protocols [79].  
Space-Based Transmitter Terminal: This method allows less influence to atmospheric 
turbulence as compared previous one [78]. Only the use of entangled states sent to two 






Figure 14: Scenarios for quantum communication with a space based transmitter 
terminal 
Procedure for entanglement sharing: The experimental steps needs to be followed are as 
follows: Step I: Creation and detection of qubits, Step II: Establishment of the 
entanglement, Step III: Bell-state analysis for of independent qubits. The important 
consideration factors are link attenuation and experimental flexibility. The total link 
attenuation should not exceed 60dB. Hence, entanglement can be sent over LEO but it is 
very difficult to share entanglement using GEO satellite due to higher loss and 
attenuation. The speed of transmission of data is limited due to methods of preparation 
and detection of entangled photons. 
4.2.2 Implementing BB’84 protocol  
Using Decoy state: Experimentally, for implementing QKD, single photon sources are 
developed from faint laser pulses, which may have more than one photon per pulse. To 
overcome the Photon Number Splitting attack (PNS) for BB84 protocol in the presence 
of high loss, decoy-state method was proposed in 2003 [31]. This method proved useful 
for improving distances for QKD. The key point for decoy state idea is that Alice 
prepares a set of additional states, i.e. decoy states along with the standard BB’84 states. 
These decoy states are meant for frustrating Eve and detect presence of Eve on 
communication channel. If Eve tries to attack with photon number splitting method, it is 
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easily captured with the help of decoy state. The only difference between standard states 
and decoy state is their intensities [80]. Experimental demonstration of free-space decoy-
state quantum key distribution over 144km is explained in [81]. Use of decoy state 
enabled to distribute a secure key at a rate 12.8 bit/s at an attenuation of about 35dB. This 
experiment utilizes simple transmitter setup and an optical ground station capable of 
tracking a spacecraft in low earth orbit.  
Using single-photons: Another experiment based on the exchange of single-photons 
between a LEO transmitter (at a perigee height of 1458km) and ground station is reported 
in [82]. The systems used are devised for geodynamical monitoring by means of an 
optical pulse from a station on the Earth and the retro reflectors on the satellite. This is 
called as satellite laser ranging (SLR).  According to the link budget analysis presented in 
[82], about 1.2 ∗ 105photons are sent and only 0.4 photons are directed in the channel. 
This experiment demonstrates the feasibility of existence of quantum channel.  
4.2.3 Technological challenges for entangled or single photon approach 
 Various experiments reported in [78], [83], [81], [82] demonstrates the feasibility 
of global QKD with the help of satellites. These experiments are however, face certain 
practical limitations such as use of two separate communication channel, compatibility 
with the state-of-the-art technology used for satellite communication, speed and distance 
limitations due to use of single photons, etc. According to the concept of QKD, only keys 
are exchanged using satellite rest of the secure communication must take place over 
another satellite communication channel, which in turn means more resource utilization 
for secure communication. This can be considered as a major disadvantage since the 
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resources in space communication are very limited. For QKD, popular wavelength used 
is 800nm because the best single-photon detectors exist at 800nm [83]. However, the 
most widely used wavelength in telecom equipment is 1550nm. Thus we can see that 
problem of compatibility arises due to the use of single photons. Furthermore, rate of 
information transfer is limited by maximal number of photons or entangled pairs 
generated or detected. Typical standard repetition rate for pulsed laser (used in generating 
entangled photons) are of the order of 106 − 107 𝑠−1, and detector system have a 
maximal detection rate of few MHz [78]. Number of photons limits the distances of QKD 
to LEO and, under certain circumstances to MEO. However, GEO communication is not 
possible with single or decoy state methods [84]. Table 2 shows the distances covered for 
the BB’84 protocol using a single photon and a decoy state approach.  
Scenarios BB’84 single photons 
(distance in km) 
BB’84 decoy state 
(distance in km) 
Uplink (Turbulence attenuation 5 dB) 460 4650 
Uplink (Turbulence attenuation 11 
dB) 
- 2200 
Downlink 1540 9450 
Inter-satellite 430 2660 
Table 2 Critical distances in km for each method from [84] 
4.3 Multi-photon approach can reach the heights of GEO satellite  
Moving towards a goal of global QKD, satellite-aided communication has 
overcome the distance limitations up to certain extend. The use of multiple photons in 
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quantum implementations has potential to improve speed and distance of communication. 
In the following section, implementation of the three-stage protocol and its extension, the 
braided single stage protocol for satellite communication is explained.  
Advantages of using the multi-photon approach 
Efficient use of channel resources: The multi-photon tolerant protocols are used not only 
for distribution of quantum keys but for actual communication at data rates comparable to 
today’s data rates. Thus, we can achieve quantum secure communication using multi-
photon tolerant protocols. Other methods of quantum cryptography such as BB’84 
protocol, key distribution using entangled pairs require two communication channel 
between sender and receiver [78]. For multi-photon protocols, only one optical (quantum) 
channel is required for data transmission. Thus, resources are used efficiently in this 
proposed approach.  
Photon generation and detection:  For use of entangled pair of photons, one transmitter 
terminal and two simultaneous analyzing receiver terminals which individually can vary 
their measurement basis and store the arrival time of single-photon detection events, are 
required [85]. Given the state-of-the art technologies present in today’s quantum devices, 
the rate of information transfer is limited by the maximal number of pairs that can be 
created and detected [78]. Similar is the case with single photons, where maximum 
detector rate is restricted by the operation in Geiger mode up to some tens of kHz in case 
of InGaAs detectors. The proposed multi-photon approach uses full beam laser pulse as a 
source and hence it is compatible with the lasercom technology used in contemporary 
satellite devices, which produce data rates up to few gigabits per sec. The limitation in 
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speed in our approach is possible due to mechanical shutter operations to send bit ‘0’ or 
‘1’.  
Number of photons and Possibility of achieving GEO communication 
In contemporary quantum cryptography techniques, use of single photons or entangled 
photons limits the distance of communication. If number of photons per pulse is 
increased for BB’84 protocol, Eve can easily perform photon number splitting attack and 
security of the protocol is cracked. From the performance analysis discussions in [86], 
simulations for the key generation rate as a function of the link distance are shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Simulations of key generation rate as a function of distance 
In the case of the uplink the attenuation is so high that the secure key generation rate is 
extremely low (of the order of 10−12, on the other hand it is not possible to increase the 
value of μ in order to avoid photon number splitting attack. When the attenuation grows, 
Eve’s attacks are more difficult to be detected. From Table 2, it can be realized that 
improvement in distance is due to increase in number of photons per pulse.   
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Also following specifications can support our deduction of increase in distance 
with increase in number of photons. Link power budget for lasercom systems explained 
in [70], provides the relation of number of photons required per bit to detect accurately at 







𝑛′ = required number of signal photons per bit (counted at the receiver) 
𝑃𝑇 = transmit power in W,    𝑑𝑟 =  diameter of the receiver 
aperture in m, 
𝐹𝐿 = combined efficiency of transmitter and receiver, Q = quantum efficiency, 
Γ𝑡






, where 𝜌0 is coherence 
length in cm,  
M = safety factor of the design of the communication link,  
R = distance between transmitter and receiver in km,  𝜃𝑡 = optical beam width in 
rad,    
ℎ𝑣 = energy per photon in J/Hz/photon,   f = data rate in bits per 
second   
For fixed transmit power of 10 W and at a fixed data rate of 1 Gbps, the number 
of photons that are received at the receiver (𝑛′) are inversely proportional to the distance 
between transmitter and receiver (𝑅), i.e., 𝑛′  ∝  
1
𝑅2
. For a laser communication using 
wavelength (𝜆) of 1550 nm, we used a quantum efficiency (𝑄) to be 0.5, diameter of the 
receiver aperture (𝑑𝑟) of 0.5 m, coherence length (𝜌0) of 0.08m, an optical beamwidth 
(𝜃𝑡) of 5 µrad, Plank’s constant (ℎ) of 6.625 𝑋 10
−34 J/Hz/photon, we plotted the 
number of received photons (𝑛′) as a function of the distance between transmitter and the 




Figure 16: Plot of the relation between numbers of photons received as a function of 
distance in km 
We can see that at a distance of around 35730 km, we will be able to receive around 380 
photons on an average to complete the polarization state measurements, which is a 
sufficient number of photons to perform the task.  
4.4 Scheme for implementation of braided single stage protocol for satellite 
communication 
4.4.1 Technical challenges for implementation: 
Point ahead angle: One of the important aspect for FSO satellite communication with 
narrow laser beams is consideration of point ahead angle. Because of the finite velocity 
of light (c) and the relative angular velocity of communication terminals moving in space, 
the transmit beam must be directed towards the receiver's position it will have at some 
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later time. This point ahead angle is given by 𝛽 = 2 ∗
𝑉𝑅
𝐶
 where, 𝑉𝑅 is the relative velocity 
between transmitter and receiver as illustrated in Figure 17 [87].  
 
Figure 17: Point ahead angle β for space craft S1 and S2 that have a relative velocity 
component V_R orthogonal to the line of sight. Shown with dotted lines: position of 
S2 at time instants indicated (L: distance, c: velocity of light) 
For inter-satellite communications, point-ahead angle is required from both sides. It 
amounts up to 40 μrad for a GEO-GEO link and up to 70 μrad for a LEO-GEO link and 
may thus be appreciably larger than the beam width. While implementing the three-stage 
protocol, we have to consider calculations of point ahead angle at each stage. For the 
three-stage protocol, information traverse back and forth three times and this traversing 
can be considered as a drawback in satellite communication. Also, one has to consider the 
fact that if Alice is on the ground and Bob is in the space, there will be two uplinks and 
one downlink set up for single bit of information transfer. The power link budget for 
implementing the three-stage protocol should consider the directions of photon travel.  
Influence of satellite motion on polarization of qubits: As mentioned in previous 
subsection, in satellite transceivers, a pointing system is required to send the photons 
from sender to receiver accurately. This pointing system consist of mirrors assembly, 
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hence effect of these assembly on satellite motion is studied in [88]. Mirrors are used to 
provide a constant offset, hence they introduce time-dependent modification which can 
be compensated by proper calibration. One of the solutions discussed in [88], is to 
deterministically calculate the actual polarization rotation by theoretical calculations 
given the satellite trajectory and pointing angles are known. But this requires knowledge 
of the refractive indices of all the mirrors in the satellite system. The change in 
polarization over satellite can also be detected by polarization compensation process. The 
polarization compensation process is described as follows:  
Step 1: Alice and Bob will require a set of known polarization states (say 
0°, 30°, 45°, 60°…180° predetermined amongst them. Since the channel used is 
bidirectional, we characterize channel from Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice.  
Step 2: Alice sends a horizontal polarization (0°) for some time, and Bob receives, say, 
δb° change in polarization. Similarly Bob sends a horizontal polarization, and Alice 
receives δa° change in polarization state. Ideally, δb°= δa°, but it might not be the case. 
This change in angle of polarization of beam of light can be compensated while 
modulating with a particular angle.  
Step 3: Add the compensation during operation of the protocol, i.e., suppose Alice wants 
to send bit ‘0’ with angular transform in polarization of 𝜃𝐴°, then resulting polarization 
angle sent by Alice would be (𝜃𝐴° + 𝛿𝑏°). Similarly, Bob will send his polarization angle 
𝜃𝐵 + 𝛿𝑎 for communication.  
This procedure can be implemented at the beginning of the data transfer only once and 
can be repeated if drastic change in atmospheric turbulences is expected. One important 
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thing to note is, values of compensation angle differ for uplink and downlink for obvious 
effects of atmospheric turbulence.  
4.4.2 Implementation of the braided single-stage protocol for satellite communication 
For satellite-aided communication, different scenarios where point-to-point 
quantum communication can be implemented are described as follows: Ground-to-space 
communication, inter-satellite communication and ground-to-ground communication 
with satellite relay. All of these scenarios can be explained with typical quantum analogy, 
where Alice is sender of information and Bob is the receiver of information. Unlike other 
quantum cryptography methods, the multi-photon tolerant approach requires only one 
quantum channel for communication. The distances to be bridged may extend anywhere 
from a few hundred kilometers to thousands of kilometers.  
Ground-to-space communication: In this setup, a transmitter can be ground station or a 
transmitter can be spacecraft. The main limiting factor is atmospheric turbulence. The 
smaller-scale turbulence causes beam width broadening whereas large-scale turbulences 
might cause beam deflection (beam wondering) [89]. Usually, uplinks face more 
broadening because they first propagate through turbulent atmosphere.  
Inter-satellite communication: In this set-up both Alice and Bob are in space and hence 
the effect of atmospheric turbulence is very low. We can achieve maximum bit rate in 
this scenario. 
Ground-to-ground communication: In this set-up two ground stations can be connected 




Terminals for optical communication links are mostly designed for bi-directional 
links. The major design parameter in a transceiver system are laser wavelength, 
modulation format, data rate and reception technique [78]. The proposed transceiver 
system block diagram for multi-photon approach is as shown in Figure 18. The encoding 
scheme used is polarization encoding where 0° polarization indicate bit ‘0’ and 90° 
polarization indicate bit ‘1’. Laser is the light source for transmitting data, popularly 1550 
nm wavelength is chosen. 
 






Steps of operation are as follows: 
1. Laser beam is passed through a beam splitter to split in two paths one of which 
passes through 0° polarizer and other through 90° polarizer. Alice depending 
upon whether the bit sent is’0 ‘or’1’ operates shutters. Using mirrors and beam 
combiner assembly, beam is then directed towards polarization modulator. 
2. A polarization modulator is a device that will change plane of polarization 
through some angle 𝜃. In proof of experiment of the braided single-stage protocol, 
half wave plates are used [90].  
3. The optical beam passes a fine pointing assembly before it enters telescope that is 
acting as a transmitting antenna. The functions of telescope include increasing 
beam diameter and thus reducing divergence. A coarse pointing assembly 
provides for steering the antenna.  
Thus, Alice transmits data to be sent ‘X’ in the form of linearly polarized light 
(𝑈𝐴(𝑋)) to Bob with the help of telescoping antenna. In the experiments reported 
in [91] proves that degree of polarization was maintained up to 99.4% in the 
satellite communication.  
4. Now, at Bob’s station, received light beam passes the telescopic antenna and the 
fine pointing assembly and directed towards a polarization modulator. A point-
ahead-angle assembly (PAA) has to be inserted in the receiver path to allow 
electronic control of the internal angular alignment between transmission and 
reception. Bob applies his transform and sends linearly polarized light (𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐴(𝑋)) 
back to Alice. 
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5. At Alice’s end, she will use polarization modulator to remove her transform and 
send the optical beam back to Bob. Eventually, Bob applies polarization 
modulator to remove his transform and beam is passed through beam splitter. 
6.  After splitting the beam, it is passed through 0° polarizer and 90° polarizer to 
detect bit ‘0’ or ‘1’. 
7. The output of the detector is used as an input for acquisition and tracking 
electronics to calculate the coarse adjustments.   
8. Now that Alice and Bob has shared a message ‘X’ completely securely, a new 
angle of transform is calculated at both Alice and Bob’s end by the formula 
mentioned. So for next iteration, whenever Alice send a message with her 
transform 𝑈𝐴(X), Bob already knows value of 𝑈𝐴 and hence applies 𝑈𝐴
†
 to get 
information directly. 
Thus, the three-stage protocol and its extension, the braided single-stage protocol 
can be implemented over satellite communication. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided the details of the ground to satellite segment in the global 
network. With development in free space optics technology it has become feasible to 
communicate over longer distances in space communication. This chapter proves that 
quantum key distribution protocols can be implemented at the heights of GEO 
communications. The details of challenges in implementation, procedure of 
implementation and block diagram of the transceiver has been provided in this chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Multi-photon based threshold quantum cryptography  
The science of cryptography was developed to achieve secure communication 
between multiple parties. Traditionally, cryptography only deals with the communication 
between one sender and one receiver. However, more commonly, a communication is 
required between an individual and an organization or between different organizations. 
Moreover, many crucial decisions in an organization are made by a group of people and 
not an individual. Therefore, there is the requirement to guarantee the authenticity of 
messages sent by a group of individuals to another group or a person. Hence, the 
threshold cryptography based on secret sharing was developed.  
Some classical threshold encryption schemes were developed based on some 
popular public key encryption schemes such as RSA, ElGamal cryptosystems. While 
secure distributed computation has a more general scope, many of these schemes are not 
practical. Classical threshold cryptography faces certain drawbacks such as, a) the 
resulting cipher text becomes very large which affects the efficiency of the schemes, b) 
the shared keys can be used only once, c) it is not possible to detect the presence of 
eavesdropper on any of the communication channel, and hence the shared secrets cannot 
be used. Moreover, the classical methods are only conditionally secure. 
On the other hand, quantum cryptography provides unconditional security. 
Quantum communication is the most promising application of quantum information 
theory. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows two legitimate parties to communicate 
secretly over communication channel in the presence of an adversary. Various QKD 
protocols have been proposed since the pioneering works of Bennett and Brassard. 
However, the applications of BB84 and its variants are limited to point-to-point 
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communication. Recently, there is the necessity of secure point-to-multipoint 
communication. The purpose of threshold cryptography is to develop a technique to deal 
with multi-sender/multi-receiver scenario. In this dissertation, we propose a multi-photon 
approach for quantum threshold cryptography.  The multi-photon approach uses Shamir's 
secret sharing method to generate shares of the classical secret and uses threshold 
collaborative unitary transformation for distribution of those shares. Multi-photon 
tolerant approach was discussed in [42] . The advantages provided by multi-photon 
approach are ease of implementation, increase in speed of communication and longer 
distances of communication as compared to single photon approach. 
5.1 Background 
The concept of threshold cryptography evolves from the idea: Instead of giving 
the key for the encrypted secret to an individual, it may be desirable to distribute 
information in such a way that no single party alone has the whole knowledge of the key, 
but a few of them can jointly determine the key. 
Mathematical Logic of Sharing the Secret 
The mathematical logic for making shares of the secret is based on Shamir's secret 
sharing method as mentioned in [92]. The goal is to divide secret 𝑆 (e.g., a safe 
combination) into 𝑛 pieces of data 𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛 in such a way that: 
i. Knowledge of any 𝑡 or more 𝑆𝑖 pieces makes 𝑆 easily computable, where 𝑖 =
1, 2, … , 𝑛. 
ii. Knowledge of any 𝑡 − 1 or fewer 𝑆𝑖 pieces leaves 𝑆 completely undetermined 
(in the sense that all its possible values are equally likely). 
66 
 
This scheme above is called (𝑡, 𝑛) threshold scheme. If 𝑡 = 𝑛, then all participants are 
required in order to reconstruct the secret. We will explain how this scheme works with 
the following example. Let 𝐹 be a finite field. We want to share the secret 𝑆 using 
Shamir's secret share amongst 𝑛 users.  
𝑆 → (𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛) 
The secret can be retrieved when t users collaborate in three steps: 
i. Choose arbitrary positive integers 𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑡−1, which are to be coefficients of 
𝑡 − 1 degree polynomial 𝑓(𝑧) as in the next step and  𝑓0 = 𝑆. 
ii. Build a polynomial 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑓0 + 𝑓1×𝑧 + ⋯+ 𝑓𝑡−1×𝑧
𝑡−1 , where 𝑓(0) = 𝑓0 = 𝑆. 
iii. Calculate and share the points on that polynomial (𝑧𝑖, 𝑓(𝑧𝑖))where 𝑓(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑖) 
with party index 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛. 
For recovery, when 𝑡 parties out of 𝑛 have a part of the secret, i.e. any subset of 𝑡 pairs, 
then we have 𝑡 points on the curve of (𝑡 − 1) degree polynomial, so by this fact, we get 
unique coefficients to a (𝑡 − 1) degree polynomial. We use Lagrange Interpolation over a 
finite field. The details of the method are given section 5.2. Solving the linear systems, 
we can find out the coefficient 𝑓0. The secrecy of the shared secret is guaranteed based on 
the following explanation. Suppose we have only 𝑡 − 1 parties contributing shares. This 
corresponds to knowing only 𝑡 − 1 point on 𝑡 − 1 degree polynomial. It turns out we 
cannot find out coefficient 𝑓0 using this partial information. Given 𝑡 − 1 pairs of 
(𝑖, 𝑓(𝑖)), we need point (0, 𝑆). If we just know 𝑡 − 1 points, none of which has input 0, 
the conditional distribution on these points on having a point (0, 𝑆) is still uniform. Thus, 
all values of the secret 𝑆 are equally likely and the secret holds. 
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Quantum secret sharing 
This subsection explains another method for sharing secret and how it is different 
from the proposed approach. The pioneering work in quantum secret sharing (QSS) is 
presented in [93]. It allows a secret quantum state to be shared among many participants 
in such a way that only the authorized groups can reconstruct it. A method for sharing 
classical secret using quantum information to transmit the shares securely in presence of 
an eavesdropper using three-particle and four-particle GHZ states was proposed in [18]. 
In [94], the concept of threshold cryptography was discussed and it claimed that the only 
constraint on the existence of threshold schemes comes from the quantum 'no-cloning 
theorem', which requires the total number of parties 𝑛 ≤ 2𝑡 where 𝑡 is threshold number. 
This work led to many theoretical and experimental researches, mainly divided into two 
categories: QSS of classical messages [94-96] and QSS of quantum information where 
the secret is an arbitrary unknown qubit [95] [93] [97]. Entangled states are used in [94-
96].   The proposed multi-photon approach differs from QSS because the shared secrets 
are classical information and we use collaborative quantum unitary transform.  
In 2005, a (𝑛, 𝑛) threshold scheme of multiparty quantum secret sharing of classical 
messages (QSSCM) using only single photons was proposed in  [98]. One of the 
shortcomings of this protocol is all the members have to be present in order to decrypt a 
secret. Thus, in case of interrupted communication when any one of the 𝑛 parties is not 
available, the secret cannot be accessed by anyone else. The proposed approach requires 
only 𝑡 users with 𝑡 < 𝑛 for reconstructing the secret and hence more efficient in practice. 
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5.2 Threshold quantum cryptography with single photon 
Threshold quantum cryptography combines secret sharing schemes with several quantum 
cryptographic functions. The threshold version of quantum cryptography based on 
conjugate coding was proposed in [99]. It takes an example of quantum money proposed 
in [9] to show that when classical secret is shared by using quantum unitary transforms, 
the constraint of no cloning theorem does not apply on the protocol. In the concept of t 
out of n threshold quantum cryptography scheme suggested by [99].   
 𝐾 = (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑎2, 𝑏2, … , 𝑎𝑚, 𝑏𝑚) 
 where, m=log2L is the binary representation of the original secret with ; where L 
is bitwise length of secret; 𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 are chosen uniformly from {0,1} then bits 𝑎1, 𝑎2.. are 
encoded with bases 𝑏1, 𝑏2 …𝑏𝑚 respectively. The bases are chosen from 
|0⟩ 𝑜𝑟 |1⟩ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |+⟩ 𝑜𝑟 |−⟩  
In this protocol, the dealer makes shares of the secret and distributes it among n 
authorized users. Now t out of n users can collaborate to obtain the original secret. The 
scheme is based on Shamir's secret sharing method. There are 3 phases in the t out of n 
threshold quantum cryptography protocol, distribution phase, pre-computation phase, and 
issuing phase. In this section, we will explain in detail the first two phases as it is from 
[99] and issuing phase in more general form so these steps can be applied into our 
proposed protocol. 
Distribution phase 
Following is procedure for distributing the secret among n users:  
• Dealer choose secret K  
𝐾 = (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑎2, 𝑏2, … , 𝑎𝑚, 𝑏𝑚) 
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• Dealer makes shares of the secret 𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛 using Shamirs secret sharing 
method over finite field 𝐹2
2𝑚. 
• The dealer choses 𝑥𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛 which are in  n distinct non-zero elements 
over 𝐹2
2𝑚. 
• The dealer randomly chooses a secret (t-1)th  degree polynomial 
𝑓(𝑥)𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐹2
2𝑚 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓(0) = ?̃?, here is the polynomial representation of K. 
Then dealer computes 𝑆𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑗) and secretly sends it to 𝑃𝑗  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 = 1,2. . 𝑛 
Precomputation phase 
In this phase, the centers compute the preliminary information for collaborative 
procedure. The preliminary information depends on which centers are collaborating. Let 
us assume there are t centers that collaborate to get the secret. For each 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑡 , 𝑃𝑗  
calculates and stores following value given by the Lagrange interpolation formula over 
𝐹2
2𝑚. 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝑆𝑗 ∏
𝑥𝑙
𝑥𝑙−𝑥𝑗












  be representation of each 𝐾𝑗. Each share of the secret is 
kept locally and not shared with other parties. The values of Kj follow property 
 𝐾 = ∑ 𝐾𝑗
𝑡
𝑗=1 (𝑀𝑜𝑑 2)    (2) 
Issuing phase 
In the issuing phase, we understand how each center contributes to create the original 
secret. The sequence of operation is as follows though order is not important. 
• The center P1 generates the quantum state and sends it to P2 
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[1]⟩        (3) 
 
  
• For each 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑡 , 𝑃𝑗  receives |𝜙
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where, U and V  are t h e  unitary operators of rotations. They perform the 
required quantum operation on the photons so that data transferred between 










[𝑗]                                                    (5) 
  
• For each 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑡 , 𝑃𝑗  obtains the transform  |𝜙
[𝑗]⟩  using 𝑊[𝑗] i.e.  
 
𝑊[𝑗]: |𝜙[𝑗−1]⟩  → |𝜙[𝑗]⟩     (6) 
     







5.3 Multi-photon based quantum threshold cryptography scheme 
In multi-photon approach, for achieving the security of the protocol and to limit the 
eavesdropper performance number of coherent states must be higher than the mean 
photon number. Consider the following scheme in which each data bit is encoded into 
coherent state of M possible states. Using maximum likelihood positive operated value 
measurement technique, a lower bound between the number of non-orthogonal coherent 








Multiple basis approach 
A dealer constructs n shares of a secret and distributes it to n users, which are 
authenticated via some classical method of authentication. Any t parties out of n then 
collaborate to encode the classical secret on the quantum state by a sequence of unitary 
transformations. The unitary transformations used in this operation are based on the 
secret shared between the parties. Each party changes both the basis of the bits and 
encodes the classical secret in the form of quantum state. While decoding, any of the t 
parties can again collaborate to apply the reverse of the unitary transformation to get the 
original secret back. 
Consider K is the original secret which is represented as the sequence of bits 
K = (a1, b1, a2, b2, · · · , am, bm) 
where, bits a1, a2, a3, · · · , am are uniformly chosen from 1, 0 and encoded with basis b1, 
b2, · · · , bm 
where bi = 0, 1, · · · , M −1, We consider a scheme where each data bit is encoded into 
coherent state of M possible states known as qumode. This is very similar to the qumode 
scheme chosen in Y- 00 protocol. 
There are two approaches for implementing the protocol, phase encoding and polarization 




      (10) 
The pairs are given with angle basis 
𝜃𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝑚+𝑀 = 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜋     (11) 
Each pair is opposite to each other on the polar coordinates and can be used to 
represent 0 and 1. Now for each pair, one can flip 0 to 1 or 1 to 0 by making a 𝜋 rotation. 
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On the other hand, encoding on the 𝑚𝑡ℎ basis is the same as rotating the state with 𝜃 = 0 
with an angle 𝜃𝑚. 












     (12) 
In which 𝜃 and 𝜙 are the spherical coordinates of the polarization vector r on the Block 
sphere, and 𝑎𝐻 and 𝑎𝑉 are the annihilation operators for the north pole and the south pole, 
which we designate as the horizontal and vertical polarizations respectively. We consider 




The multiphoton coherent quantum state can be expressed in terms of the superposition 
of photon number state |𝑛⟩. 















𝑛=0 |𝑛⟩        (14) 
Now, consider quantum state for the given secret K represented as, 
|𝜙⟩ = |𝜓𝑎1,𝑏1⟩⨂|𝜓𝑎2,𝑏2⟩…⊗ |𝜓𝑎𝑚,𝑏𝑚⟩   (15) 
Multi-photon t out of n quantum threshold protocol 
In this paper we assume that the dealer and the participating parties are authenticated and 
honest. We further assume that the communication channels between the parties are 
secure and error free. The detailed steps of the protocol for distributing the shares of the 
secret amongst users and pre- computation steps that user needs to complete are 
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explained in previous section. For multi-photon and multiple bases approach, equation 2 
is changed to  
       𝐾 =⊕𝑖=1
𝑡 𝐾𝑗  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀    (16) 
The issuing phase described in the previous section is the generalized procedure for 
sharing and recovering the secret. The key equation for the multi-photon scheme to be 
successful is 
𝑈𝑎′𝑉𝑏′|𝜓𝑎,𝑏⟩ = |𝜓𝑎+𝑎′,𝑏+𝑏′⟩ 
As mentioned previously, there are two approaches for implementing the proposed 





















Hence, we see that both phase encoding and polarization encoding can be successfully 
implemented with multi-photon based threshold quantum cryptography. Next, we see a 
derivative of this protocol without a dealer. 





5.5 Application of the quantum threshold scheme 
Use of quantum communication prevents the shares from copying and they can be reused 
for future communication. Any organization with very valuable secrets, such as 
certificate authorities, military, and governments, would make use of this technology. 
The multi-photon based approach using polarization helps in experimental realization of 
the protocol. An implementation scheme based on photon polarization is practically 
suitable for the proposed multi-photon quantum threshold cryptography.  Real valued or 
complex valued unitary transforms can be used for rotation of polarization. The real 
valued transforms are commutative and hence the sequence of operation on the photon 
does not matter. Hence the general threshold quantum cryptography scheme can be easily 
implemented without paying attention to the sequence. 
We consider a military application as an example of implementation based on 
multilevel-shared control schemes, where the lower level of authority (and hence 
responsibility) at a lower level of command could be satisfactorily compensated for by 
requiring a higher level of concurrence for the action to be initiated. Consider a missile 
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launching system that requires a secret code to initiate the operation. The consequences 
of a missile being launched without proper authorization would be so adverse that in 
normal times (peacetime or in lower levels of alert) the capability to initiate such an 
action should be held at a higher level of command, perhaps by the president. In other 
words, the policy is that even if all of the officers in the house believe that a missile 
should be launched, they should not be able to do so without requesting an authorization 
from the superior commander (and more importantly, could not do so without being 
given the launch enable codes).  
The missile activation code is protected by quantum secret. Per this protocol, this 
code is encoded using different shares which are given to the responsible parties in the 
cabinet. When the quantum state matches with a missile activation code, then the missile 
gets activated. There are t out of n officers needed in order to activate the system. In case 
of operation of the activation, the person in command will send request to (t-1) officers to 
contribute to generate the shared secret. The procedure is mentioned in the proposed 
protocol in this paper is followed and quantum state is sent from one user to another until 
it reaches the person in command who will contribute to tth share of the secret and gets 
secret quantum state. When he applies his unitary transform to the secret quantum state, 
the outcome is sequence that matches the secret code and the missile is activated.  
Similarly, threshold quantum cryptography can be used in corporate scenarios 
while implementing high-level business decisions. Protecting a bank account by multiple 
shares is also one such example. There are certainly many areas where a similar situation 




This chapter presents a quantum version of threshold cryptography based on multi-
photon approach. This approach has advantages over single-photon approach in the sense 
of experimental implementation. The level of security is better than that provided by 
classical threshold schemes because of the use of quantum states for actual 
communication between parties. The advantage of this approach is: although the secret is 
classical, the shares are in quantum states, which cannot be copied and hence can be 
reused even if needed. The approach of threshold cryptography without trusted dealer is a 





Chapter 6: Toward secured global communication 
Quantum communication has developed with notable progression in devices, 
techniques, and implementation. This pace of progression is likely to be maintained, if 
not increased, in the near future. Hence it will be prudent to look into the possibility of 
securing a network with a quantum approach. In this chapter, we propose a quantum key 
distribution (QKD) network underlying the existing communication network to secure 
global communication.   
A QKD-network is an infrastructure for distributing the secret keys between 
nodes on a many-to-many basis over potentially unlimited distances. Under the 
assumption that the nodes can be trusted, it utilizes the information-theoretic security of 
QKD and achieves unconditional key distribution across the network. There have been a 
couple of experiments for developing a QKD-network based on the single photon-based 
protocols with limitations on distances as discussed later in the chapter. A team from 
BBN Technologies, Boston University, and Harvard University built and operated the 
first QKD network under the sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) [100]. The network contains two nodes running the BBN QKD system 
protocols linked to the overall network by key relay. The network also contains two other 
nodes that are entanglement based. Another network developed in Vienna, Austria, is 
called SECOQC. The implementation strategy of the SECOQC is to use different types of 
QKD equipment to maximize the effectiveness of the experiment. The specific 
performance objective is to establish a QKD link that spans over 25 Km and operates at a 
rate higher than 1 Kbit/sec [101]. These implementations inspired to use multi-photon 
tolerant protocols with their advantages for designing global communication network.  
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This chapter explains the layered framework for QKD, the possibility of 
implementing QKD multicasting with satellites, and key management using threshold 
quantum cryptography. 
6.1 Layered framework for quantum key distribution 
We propose a layered framework inspired by existing optical backbone networks 
for the Internet. Currently, with single-photon QKD protocols, it is difficult to visualize a 
near future development in quantum networks because of special requirements of single 
photon-based sources and detectors. Also, the communication is point-to-point with 
distant limitations. Hence, we looked into the possibility of multi-photon-based protocols 
for quantum secure communication. The proposed layered framework consists of three 
layers—user layer, layer of secrets, and physical layer—as shown in Figure 19. The 
logical concept of actual operations is as follows: Upon the user’s request to securely 
connect with another user, the encryption keys are transferred over a layer of secrets with 
the help of the physical layer. Then the user data in its encrypted form is transferred from 
User 1 to User 2. Now, the users can keep communicating over a secure channel; and 
incorporating the concept of braiding, the underlying keys on encryption can be updated 
at a particular interval to avoid any eavesdropping. 
User Layer  
Compared to a 7-layer Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model, the user layer serves as 
an application layer. Through the proposed architecture, the user has a sense of security 
while using any form of communication without worrying about the protocols or devices 





Figure 19 Layered architecture for distributing the secret keys [103] 
 
Layer of Secrets 
In current networking situations, data is carried in the form of encrypted packets 
of information through a gigantic unsecured optical network. Nodes on the networks are 
points where more than one optical link come together. Essentially, a communication 
between two nodes can be a single link or multiple links of point-to-point connections. 
Hence, quantum cryptographic protocol can work for the interconnection of nodes. 
However, because quantum protocols need to use very few photons, traffic may slow 
down, hence throughput may also be slow. Thus, we propose a separate layer, layer of 
























network for distributing secrets out of single point-to-point QKD-Links. The 
corresponding QKD-Link end points (i.e., the QKD devices) are situated in network 
nodes. Point-to-multipoint QKD-Links can be formed as described as multicasting later 
in this chapter. For operation of the QKD scheme on the layer of secrets, we propose a 
quantum protocol suite consisting of three parts: a) quantum protocols, b) optical process 
control, and c) optical transmission. The quantum protocol defines the multi-photon-
tolerant protocols used in transmission, e.g., braided single-stage, three-stage, or Y00 
protocol. The optical process control coordinates signals between the physical 
transmission and logical steps of the protocol. Optical transmission deals with carrying 
keys using photons on a FSO channel for satellite or fiber optics channel in case of 
ground communication. As the development happens in case of quantum cryptography, 
this protocol suite can be developed to correlate to an existing seven-layer architecture of 
the OSI model [104] as shown in Figure 20. There are prospects of standardization in the 
future related to using quantum protocol suite.  
Physical Transmission Layer 
 This layer is comprised of an existing transmission network for carrying data 
around the globe. All communication between fixed points will take place over fiber 
optics. A second world of untethered radio and infrared communication involving 
portable devices will be working from this backbone infrastructure. Fiber optics provides 
high throughput and largest capacity for carrying the data as radio frequencies provide 
mobility. With the development in optical technology, we can envision all optical 
networks with very few delays and huge data capacity.  
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The layered architecture explains how keys can be transferred over network. 
Further, the question of managing the key and possibility of multicasting using the multi-
photon approach is explained in the following section. 
 
Key management and multicasting communications Key Management: 
Multicast communication is an efficient means of transmitting information over 
the Internet such as audio and video conferencing, computer–supported, co-operative 
work (CSCW), distributed databases, video and audio distribution, e-learning, and 
broadcasting stock quotes. Applying security for a multicast network is challenging due 
to the huge number of users over a network that can participate or leave dynamically. 
Hence, it is important to manage the keys over networks [105]. Another requirement for 
designing a secure, scalable key management procedure is to implement an access control 
Quantum Protocols 
Optical Process Control 
Optical Transmission Physical layer 






Figure 20 Resemblance of proposed quantum suite with OSI layers 
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mechanism to guarantee that only valid users can access the group communication 
content. The fundamental principle here is to allow the authorized entities to obtain valid 
keys. Hence, we propose a hierarchy-based scalable framework supported by threshold 
quantum cryptography as explained in chapter 5.  
The secure framework consists of a secure distribution tree composed of small 
subgroups arranged in a hierarchy and subgroups that are relatively independent. The 
members of the tree include the group security controller (GSC) that manages the top-
level subgroups, and group security agent (GSA) that manages members in the group.  
Forming a Group Request: 
• When an end user wants to form a group, s/he will send a Form a group request 
to GSA. The GSA will validate all the parties that are forming a group.  
• Once validation is completed, GSA will ping all the parties with a join the group 
invitation that will hold the shares for keys to generate the initial group key. 
• GSA will monitor the shared keys and further act as a moderator to the ongoing 
session. 
Join the Group Request:  
• When a new member sends request to join the group or when parties in a group 
send a request to add a member to the ongoing session, GSA checks the database 
for valid IDs for the new member.  
• GSA then sends a part (out of n) of group key to the new member and other 
shares (n-1) to already existing members.  
• The new member requests other (t-1) members for their share. Upon validation, 
the existing members send their shares to the new member. 
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• The new member now has sufficient shares to generate the quantum key for that 
group.  
Leaving the Group: 
• Whenever a member leaves the group, GSA updates the number of members and 
the threshold number of members required to allow a join request.  
Refresh or re-keying: 
 As soon as a member joins or leaves, the number of members changes, hence for 
future communications, the shares of the secret key changes. GSA will control this 
situation and send new keys for further communication.  The advantage of using 
threshold quantum cryptography in this case is that no one person has full access to the 
key used for encryption except GSA. Hence there will not be eavesdropping by a member 
who has left the group. Since the new member has to take permission from t out of n 
people in the group before joining, the chances of an unauthenticated user entering the 
group are reduced. Thus, in a quantum environment, the key can be managed over a 
multicast network. We further looked into technology for sending data to multiple user 
using quantum-based protocol. 
Multicast Communication 
Network topologies for satellite quantum communication can be a) point-to-point, 
b) point-to-multipoint (broadcast), or c) multi-point to multi-point (multicast). Here, we 
explain different methods with which multi-photon tolerant quantum protocols like three-
stage or braided single-stage can be implemented for the multipoint-to-multipoint 
scenario.  
Method 1: Choosing different basis for encoding 
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 For different users, a sender can choose a different pair of basis to convey the 
information in a secured manner, i.e., user 1 gets data encrypted with horizontal or 
vertical polarization pair of basis whereas user 2 gets data with diagonal or antidiagonal 
polarization pair of basis. The details about the selected basis are kept with GSA and the 
end user only. Hence, only the user with accurate basis information is able to decrypt the 
information. The basis selection can be further made more complicated by moving from 
linear polarization to elliptic and circular polarizations, thus allowing the sender to 
communicate with multiple parties when s/he intends to. 
Method 2: Choosing different wavelength  
 Considering the access through the FSO channel, a technique such as coarse 
wavelength division multiplexing (CWDM) in which multiple signals at various 
wavelengths can be used for transmission. For inter-satellite network implementation, 
there are different criteria used to choose the wavelength: 
• Availability of compact, efficient and tunable laser source 
• Adequate available peak power 
• Adequate electrical to optical conversion and overall power consumption 
• Detectors availability with sufficient sensitivity and noise level  
A simple schematic of lab implementation of CWDM is shown in Figure 21. The 
wavelengths that we chose for lab implementation purposes are 670 nm and 632.8 nm.  
The procedure for implementation to demonstrate coarse wavelength division 
multiplexing over FSO with multi-photon tolerant quantum communication protocol is 
the following.  We considered a scenario where Alice is sending secured data to Bob and 
Charlie simultaneously using different frequencies.  There can be more than one sender 
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here who can be easily modified by adding an assembly of beam combiner and laser 
source.  
1. The implementation set up uses frequency beam combiner to combine light from 
two different sources.  
2. The light is then split into two beams with 50-50 intensity beam splitter such that 
one beam passes through an assembly of shutter and polarizer kept at 0° and 
another beam passes through a similar assembly of a shutter and 90° polarizer. 
Both beams are then combined and sent over the channel. Bits are encoded as 0 or 
1 depending on the polarizer it passes through. 
3. A set of LabView-controlled rotating half-wave plates are used for encrypting the 
data. 
4. At the receiver end of Bob or Charlie, a frequency beam splitter splits the light 
beam into two parts that Bob’s and Charlie’s locations receive. There is a 
frequency filter kept at λ1 at Bob’s end and λ2 at Charlie’s end. The filter is 
followed by a detection assembly as discussed in the implementation of the 
braided single-stage protocol on FSO that is used for detection of bits.  





Figure 21 Proposed experimental set up for proof of concept of wavelength based multicasting 
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In Figure 21, BS is a beam splitter, M are mirrors, S is a shutter, Pol 90 is 900 polarizer, 
Pol 0 is 00 polarizer, WP are waveplates, FBC is a frequency beam combiner, FBS is a 
frequency beam splitter, and D are the detectors. Though lab implementation seems 
pretty simple and straightforward; for actual implementation on satellite network, there 
will be many considerations for choosing the appropriate source and respective antenna, 
the range of frequencies for communication, the performance of the detector in response 
to frequencies, and beam widening.  
6.3 Global Quantum Key Distribution Network Using Satellites 
For increasing the distances during the initial key transfer, we used satellite 
communication. The proposed global QKD system is a composite network consisting of 
space elements, i.e., satellite-to-satellite links; connect elements. i.e., ground-to-satellite 
links; and ground elements, i.e., optical node-to-node links.   
 




The optical free-space link could provide a unique solution to the globe quantum 
communication since it allows in principle for larger propagation distances of photons 
due to its low absorption into the atmosphere in certain wavelength ranges. The types of 
links that we can consider are LEO-LEO links, LEO-GEO links and GEO-GEO links. 
Paper [78] studied the attenuation on these links and showed the feasibility of quantum 
communication. One of the challenges in satellite security is handling the multicast 
network for key distribution. The key management used was that explained in the 
earlier section of this paper. 
Connect segment 
 This segment interconnects the space and ground segments via satellite–to-
ground links. The development in free space optics technology has offered benefits of 
reaching the longer distances in satellite communications. Considering implementation 
of quantum communication network, single-photon-based protocols limit the distances 
that can be reached at LEO satellites; however, with proposed multi-photon approach, 
the heights of GEO can be achieved as shown in Chapter 4. 
Space segment: 
The optical free-space link could provide a unique solution to the globe quantum 
communication since they allow in principle for larger propagation distances of photons 
due to the low absorption of the atmosphere in certain wavelength ranges. The types of 
links that we can consider are LEO-LEO links, LEO-GEO links and GEO-GEO links. 
Paper [78] studies the attenuation on these links and shows the feasibility of quantum 
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communication. One of the challenges in satellite security is handling the multicast 
network for key distribution. The key management is as explained in earlier section. 
Connect segment 
 This segment interconnects the space and ground segments via satellite to 
ground links. The development in free space optics technology has offered benefits of 
reaching the longer distances in satellite communications. Considering implementation 
of quantum communication network, single-photon based protocols limits the distances 
that can be reached at LEO satellites however, with proposed multi-photon approach the 
heights of GEO can be achieved as shown in Chapter 4.  
 
Figure 23: Relation between number of photons received as a function of distance 
in km and wavelength in nm 
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The figure shows the received number of photons at GEO satellite as a function of a 
wavelength used for the communication. It can be seen that the attenuation is higher 
during first 500 km of the link since during this time, the channel passes through earth’s 
ionosphere experiencing higher losses. These losses are also due to the pollutant 
particles and clouds. The attenuation caused by these factors is found predominant on 
the uplink as compared to the downlink since in case of uplink, the transmitter itself is 
surrounded by these factors as against the downlink. Also, at a distance of 35,730 km 
where the GEO satellites revolve around the earth, received number of photons for 
wavelengths 1550 nm, 1310 nm, and 800 nm are found to be 381, 322, and 197 
respectively, which are still sufficient to measure and get the required throughput of 1 
Gbps on the uplink. It is general trend that, as the wavelength decreases; attenuation 
increases, which is again highlighted here in Figure 23. Approximately 1–2-m diameter 
ground telescopes are needed to receive the high-rate downlink from near earth 
distances such as LEO, MEO and GEO [106]. Near-infrared wavelength lasers at 
discrete wavelengths around 800, 1310, and 1550 nm can be used. The ground stations 
in this segment are usually located in remote areas from the city for avoiding the 
ambient light noise due to city lights.  
 By providing end-to-end encryption via ground to satellite links the current 
threats in satellite communication sabotaging the links with spoofing and hacking can 
be taken care. Also, use of optical frequencies eliminates signal jamming.  
Ground segment 
The ground segment consists of different ground stations interconnected in a 
communication network. The implementation of multi-photon-based protocol in optical 
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fiber has been successfully demonstrated in [107]. The method of intrusion detection 
using polarization has been described in [108]. In addition to that, formation of quantum 
channel for transferring keys on OBS network was explained in chapter 3.  
In this way the communication around the globe can be secured from device to ground 
station to satellite and from satellite back to ground station and then to other user 
device.  
6.4 Summary  
 This chapter has provided a complete scenario for a secured global 
communication network with the multi-photon tolerant quantum protocols used for key 
distribution. The implementation details of each segment can be further studied and 
developed. The considerations for proposed design are authenticated nodes and the 
security of a multi-photon-tolerant protocol. The framework for QKD includes a 
separate layer of secrets for transferring keys from point–to-point or point-to-
multipoint. We used the quantum threshold cryptography protocol for key management 
of in-group communication. For point-to-multipoint quantum key distribution, we used 
a multicasting method. This chapter proposes the lab experimental set up for 
multicasting. The final section explained the flow of keys from ground to satellite, over 




Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
 This dissertation has investigated the potential of multi-photon tolerant protocols 
for secured global communication. This dissertation has proposed satellite-based 
network configuration and its operation that uses multi-photon tolerant protocols. The 
two main protocols discussed here are the three-stage protocol and its variant the 
braided single-stage protocol. Both the protocols have been implanted in lab 
successfully over FSO [42, 49] and in fiber [107]. The security aspects of the protocols 
have been studied in [44].  
 The proposed network configuration uses communication satellites at Lower 
Earth Orbits (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) 
for carrying the keys at long distances. The reach of quantum key distribution to the 
heights of GEO by virtue of multi-photon tolerant protocols has been presented in this 
dissertation. This dissertation further proposes multicasting in QKD with two different 
methods first with different basis and second with different wavelength. In multicast 
communication managing the key for communication is a difficult task. This 
dissertation has proposed the concept of quantum threshold cryptography. The primary 
idea for threshold cryptography is that for encryption or decryption more than threshold 
number of users is required to agree upon mutual connection. This can be considered as 
a step towards multiparty quantum communication.  
The dissertation has proposed domestic and global network configurations using 
satellites and fiber optic links that can form a composite system for carrying the 
information payload and distributing quantum-secure keys for encrypting information in 
transit. The layered network architecture for distributing quantum keys globally has 
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been proposed.  Also a quantum protocol suite based on the OSI 7 layered structure has 
been proposed in this dissertation.  
 For future work for this research, first of all there is room for standardizing the 
quantum cryptography protocols on network. A systematic protocol suite and packet 
distribution system or quantum communication can be looked in more details in future. 
There is lot of potential for research in quantum threshold cryptography. There is a need 
to bring this protocol in real world implementations. Quantum multicasting proposed in 
this dissertation seems like a simple concept but the future prospects of developing this 
area is very important from quantum network prospective.  
Overall, this dissertation can be seen as stepping stone in developing a secure global 
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